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THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
DALE CARPENTERt
The First Amendment expresses the idea that government should
not be able to tell citizens what to speak, hear, write, or read. Yet this
simple idea is riddled with exceptions so common they are barely con-
tested. These exceptions do not ordinarily depend on the quality or
value of the speech being offered but on the reason why the govern-
ment wants to restrict it. So, the federal government may not punish
draft-card burning because it encourages draft-resistance, but it may
do so because it hinders the administration of the selective service sys-
tem. The police may not shut down a Ku Klux Klan rally because it is
racist, but they may do so because it threatens an immediate riot. The
city may not forbid the use of a loudspeaker because it is used to criti-
cize the police chief, but it may do so because it disrupts the peace and
tranquility of a neighborhood. The zoning board may not refuse to li-
cense an adult theater because it is immoral, but it may do so because
the presence of the theater contributes to crime in the area. Under
the First Amendment, the justifications the government offers for sup-
pressing speech often make the difference between validity and inva-
lidity. Reasons matter.
May government restrict speech because it believes that speech is
not good for us? More to the point, may it do so because it doubts the
ability of an audience to evaluate the information and arguments in
the speech? This justification for regulation is a species of legal pater-
nalism. It is based on the fear that people will not be able to use their
freedom properly. It raises the fundamental question whether the
state may treat adults like children, substituting its judgment of their
best interests for their own.
There is widespread liberal revulsion against paternalism.' In
the words of John Stuart Mill: "[TIhe only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I want to
thank Larry Alexander, Guy Charles, Jim Chen, Carol Chomsky, Dan Farber, Brett
McDonnell, David McGowan, Michael Paulsen, Adam Samaha and participants in a
University of Minnesota Law School faculty workshop for helpful comments.
1. David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519,
519 (1988). I mean "liberal" here in the classical Millian sense, not in the modern politi-
cal sense.
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physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."2 This famous passage,
often taken principally to state Mill's harm principle, also states an
antipaternalist corollary to that principle. The state cannot regulate a
person for his own good.
Yet, disfavored as it is in theory, paternalism pervades the law.
Examples of paternalism include: laws requiring people to wear hel-
mets while operating a motorcycle; laws requiring the use of seatbelts
in cars; laws forbidding gambling; laws against usury; laws forbidding
swimming when no lifeguard is present; laws against dueling; limita-
tions on the legal rights and capacity of minors and mentally disabled
people; restrictions on the use of recreational drugs; the Social Secur-
ity system, which compels individual investment in retirement; the
prohibition against suicide; and compulsory education laws. 3
The law of contract alone, usually seen as a fortress of individual
autonomy, is rife with paternalism. Contract law prohibits, among
other things, self-enslavement and contracts by those deemed incom-
petent to make them. It also prevents contractual waiver of a host of
rights, including: a tenant's right to refuse to pay rent if the leasehold
is uninhabitable, a promisor's right to sue for divorce or to seek relief
in bankruptcy, the right of either party to seek specific enforcement,
and the right to a "cooling-off" period in many consumer transactions.
In each case, it is thought, the government restrains individuals be-
cause it has concluded it knows better than they what is good for
them. Few question the need for at least some paternalistic restric-
tions on freedom.
The Constitution is not now understood generally to prohibit gov-
ernment paternalism. That was not always so. In the Lochner era,
the Court invalidated numerous economic regulations, like minimum-
wage and maximum-hours laws, that were thought to be needed to
protect people from their own willingness to work under difficult con-
ditions or for very low wages. The Court thought these restrictions
violated a person's right to bargain for his own wages and hours,
under his own estimation of what was best for him. In Walters v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,4 which upheld a limit of a $10 fee to
lawyers who represent veterans seeking benefits for service-related
disability, the Court noted the demise of Lochner v. New York, 5 invali-
dating state economic regulation because it interfered with the liberty
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. 1956) (1859).
3. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 20 (RolfSartorius ed., 1983);
Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 230 (1998), Anthony T.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 763-64 (1983).
4. 473 U.S. 305 (1985).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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of contract, observing: "That day is fortunately long gone, and with it
the condemnation of rational paternalism as a legitimate legislative
goal."6
By contrast, in the law of free speech, and perhaps in this area of
the law alone, paternalism has been largely rejected. While the rest of
the Constitution contains no general prohibition on paternalism as a
justification for state regulation, the First Amendment is hostile to it.7
Indeed, deep concern about paternalism in speech regulation tran-
scends the usual left-right divide on the Court.8 Commentators gener-
ally agree the First Amendment is hostile to paternalism. 9 Yet, most
analysts invoke the idea of free speech antipaternalism without exam-
ining its roots, explaining what it means, or discussing what it entails.
There has been no attempt to identify and to explain what I call the
6. Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307, 323 (1985).
But see Walters, 473 U.S. at 367 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is rather misleading to
imply that a rejection of the Lochner holding is an endorsement of rational paternalism
as a legitimate legislative goal.").
7. The Court maybe crafting a form of antipaternalism in the regulation of sexual
conduct, where it has emphasized the importance of securing individual autonomy
against the state. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas anti-
sodomy law).
8. Two passionate First Amendment antipaternalists currently on the Court are
Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia. See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509
U.S. 418, 439 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
9. Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HARv. L. REV. 554, 557-58 (1991) ("Government regulation of speech is
often based on the premise that people respond irrationally to certain ideas or types of
information. Skepticism regarding this premise is central to modern First Amendment
doctrine. The First Amendment is based on the belief that people will make better deci-
sions if they are more fully informed .... [Tiraditional First Amendment jurisprudence
... assumes that people are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and of the
methods necessary for satisfying those interests."), Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regula-
tion and The First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 212 (1983) ("The Court has
long embraced an 'anti-paternalistic' understanding of the first amendment."), Vincent
Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLum. L. REV. 449,
473 (1985) ("Familiar first amendment principles include the prohibitions [ I against...
regulatory justifications grounded in the paternalistic claim that audiences will act con-
trary to their own best interests if exposed to certain arguments or information."); Rod-
ney A. Smolla, The Culture of Regulation, 5 COMMMON L. CONSPECTUS 193, 202 ("When
the First Amendment is implicated, paternalism is the exception, not the rule."); Gary
Goodpaster, Equality and Free Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IOWA
L. REV. 645, 672 (1997) ("The Court has also found an antipaternalism principle in the
First Amendment because paternailsm obviously offends autonomy."); Wojciech Sadur-
ski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDozo
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 366 (1997) ("[Platernalism, in general terms, is an attitude essen-
tially foreign to the core values of freedom of speech."). On the other hand, some com-
mentators suggest that, as a motivation for speech regulation, paternalism may be less
objectionable than intolerance of dissenting or unorthodox ideas. Sadurski, 15 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. at 368.
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antipaternalism principle across a variety of free speech domains. 10
This Article examines the nature and reach of this particular brand of
First Amendment exceptionalism.
The Supreme Court has never upheld a speech regulation it
deemed either paternalistic or justified by the government on a pater-
nalistic rationale. Just as a finding of "protectionism" is invariably
fatal to a state law burdening interstate commerce,1 1 a finding of "pa-
ternalism" is invariably fatal to a federal or state law regulating
speech. But this fact may not be as significant as it sounds. It might
be that paternalism is little more than a rhetorical bogeyman, invoked
when the Court has decided for independent reasons to strike down a
statute, and disregarded when the Court has for independent reasons
decided to uphold the law.12
The Court has not been entirely consistent in its application of the
antipaternalism principle. But occasional inconsistency in application
of the antipaternalism principle does not mean the underlying idea is
incoherent or that some general understanding cannot be derived
from its use. Still, that underlying idea must be identified. Is there a
discernible principle or set of principles behind First Amendment anti-
paternalism that explains many of the results in past cases and use-
fully predicts results in future ones?
Answering this question involves, first, settling on a First Amend-
ment definition of paternalism and, second, deciding what anti-
paternalism commits us to in the realm of speech regulation. As to the
first question, the Court has never defined paternalism. It has simply
used the word in circumstances that implicitly suggest a definition.
That definition is a specialized one that differs in important ways
from the definition of paternalism that might be offered by econo-
mists, political scientists, or philosophers. In the First Amendment,
paternalism means: a restriction on otherwise protected speech justi-
10. David Shapiro has made the most serious effort to do so to date, devoting sev-
eral paragraphs to the issue in a much longer piece defending antipaternalism in the
law generally. Shapiro, 74 VA. L. REV. at 542-44 (noting the explicit or implicit hostility
to paternalism in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence relating to commercial
speech and pornography). There have been noteworthy efforts to catalogue and explain
the Court's concern with preserving listener autonomy, a closely related but distinct
First Amendment principle. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of
Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 334, 334-371 (1991).
11. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("Thus, where simple eco-
nomic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity
has been erected.").
12. "Paternalism is something we often accuse people of. It suggests the view that
the state stands to its citizens as a parent.., stands to his children .... This sounds so
outrageous that we would expect hardly anyone to confess to even paternalistic tenden-
cies, much less boldly affirm the paternalistic principle and wave the paternalistic ban-
ner." JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 4 (1986).
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fled by the government's belief that speaking or receiving the informa-
tion in the speech is not in citizens' own best interests.13 The
antipaternalism principle disfavors such justifications.
Second, as I see it, the antipaternalism principle entails six core
commitments. First, it prevents the state from adopting what I call an
information-denying strategy to achieve what it thinks are citizens'
best interests. Second, it restrains the state's role as a central deci-
sion-maker, disabling the state from restricting the flow of speech as a
method of discouraging choices made by individuals in their own best
interests because the state believes those decisions will harm the col-
lective welfare. Third, it forbids information-denying speech regula-
tion even if the speech restriction will actually accomplish its aim of
manipulating citizens' decision-making in a direction the state be-
lieves is in citizens' best interests. Fourth, it invalidates speech regu-
lation that restricts the flow of information to the recipient of the
information, regardless of whether the regulation takes the form of a
restraint on the speaker or the recipient. Fifth, it prevents the state
from justifying speech regulation based on the primary effect the
speech will have on recipients. Finally, it prevents the state from jus-
tifying speech regulation based on the presumed offense the speech
will cause recipients.
The choice of the word "principle" to identify this antipaternalist
phenomenon in the First Amendment is deliberate. I use it in the
sense that Vincent Blasi has used it to mean "a value proposition of
sufficient generality and thrust that for a fair number of particular
cases acceptance or rejection of the proposition constitutes a major va-
riable in determining how the case is resolved."14 Notice that the com-
mitment to antipaternalism in free speech doctrine is not an absolute.
It could conceivably be overcome by a particularly weighty govern-
mental interest that could only be justified by a paternalistic ratio-
nale. The Court does this by avoiding the label "paternalism" to
describe the government's justification for a speech restriction, even
where that justification is plainly paternalistic. Rather than being an
13. I leave aside the question of whether certain categories of speech should be
completely unprotected, and the question of what might justify leaving them unpro-
tected. For example, some categories of speech seem to be unprotected because they
have little or no value as contributions to public debate. Fighting words and perjury
may fit that description. I do believe, but leave unaddressed here, that if certain catego-
ries of speech are to remain unprotected the reason for declining to protect them should
not be a paternalistic one. That is, categories of speech should not be left unprotected
simply because we believe receiving the information in the speech is not in citizens' own
best interests. Obscenity, in my view, could conceivably be left unprotected on the
grounds that it is low-value, but not on the grounds that citizens' own personal morals
would be polluted by it.
14. Blasi, COLUM. L. REV. at 473.
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unyielding rule that determines results in every case, it is more akin
to the strong background music of the First Amendment - ever pre-
sent, sometimes unheard in the cacophony of events, but often
brought to the fore of consciousness.
Part I reviews First Amendment jurisprudence where the Court
evinces, either explicitly or implicitly, some aversion to paternalism.
This review covers several free speech frontiers, including commercial
speech, lawyer solicitation and advertising, political parties, sexual
speech and related zoning laws, charitable fundraising, campaign fi-
nance, and corporate speech. Part II identifies the contours of the an-
tipaternalism principle. Part III examines the relationship of the
antipaternalism principle to prominent negative and positive theories
of the First Amendment, including the self-government, autonomy,
and marketplace rationales for the protection of free speech. Part IV
anticipates, and seeks to rebut, criticisms of the antipaternalism
principle.
A note of caution is necessary. I do not claim here that the anti-
paternalism principle supplies an all-encompassing theory of the First
Amendment or that it answers all questions related to First Amend-
ment doctrine. Indeed, though it is an important part of First Amend-
ment doctrine, it is only a small part. All of the usual questions that
vex First Amendment theorists - distinctions between content-neu-
tral and content-based restrictions, the vagaries of the public forum
doctrine, what is protected speech and what is not, and whether there
ought to be a distinction between low-value and high-value speech,
among many others - remain to be applied and debated in the con-
text of many controversies. The antipaternalism principle helps to an-
swer only one kind of question - what sort of justification for speech
regulation is proper?
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
Even in the short history of First Amendment jurisprudence, 15
the Supreme Court's explicit concern with paternalism is a recent phe-
nomenon. There has long been generalized aversion to attempts by
the state to command citizens' speech and thoughts for purposes the
state thinks worthwhile. In the memorable words of Justice Jackson:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in polit-
ics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
15. The Supreme Court did not begin seriously considering First Amendment chal-
lenges to speech restrictions until World War I.
[Vol. 37
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to confess by word or act their faith therein."16 This has been coupled
with a concern that citizens should be able to have and to express
their own views about public affairs, free of state coercion. Taken to-
gether, these principles form a barrier to state efforts to regulate the
content of citizens' informational environment for their own good.
Prior to 1976, the Court occasionally struck down speech regula-
tions on grounds that resemble antipaternalism, 17 but not explicitly
for that reason. Often, the Court has couched this attitude in terms of
the First Amendment right to "receive information and ideas" that
outweighs various asserted state interests in keeping people from re-
ceiving information and ideas for their own benefit.1 8 The Court has
repeatedly affirmed it is the role of the people, not the state, to judge
for themselves the worth of ideas in their informational environment.
An antipaternalist impulse has thus been at the root of the Court's
protection of political speech. 19
However, the Court did not explicitly reject paternalism as a jus-
tification for speech regulation until Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,20 the 1976 decision
that introduced commercial speech as a class enjoying some degree of
constitutional protection.2 1 Since then, antipaternalist sentiment has
percolated in most of the Court's commercial speech cases. 22 At the
16. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 624, 642 (1943)
(invalidating state flag-salute requirement for schoolchildren). See also Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of the First
Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public
mind through regulating the press, speech, and religion.").
17. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
18. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972).
19. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IowA L.
REV. 589, 612 (1996).
20. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21. I am hardly the first to note the strong antipaternalist strain in the Court's
commercial speech cases. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 185 (1997) ("[A]ntipathy toward State paternalism has been a
central focus of the Court's commercial speech decisions."); Blasi, 85 COLUM. L. REV. at
487 ("In striking down state prohibitions on accurate price advertising by pharmacists
and lawyers, the Court explicitly inveighed against the paternalistic premises of the
restrictions, thus giving the antipaternalism principle a position of new prominence in
first amendment doctrine."). But, noting the Court's somewhat inconsistent application
of the principle, Vincent Blasi questions whether the Court has perhaps undermined
the antipaternalism principle rather than strengthened it. Id.
22. I am hardly the first to note the strong antipaternalist strain in the Court's
commercial speech cases. See Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 185 (1997) ("[Alntipathy toward State paternalism has been a
central focus of the Court's commercial speech decisions."); Blasi, 85 COLUM. L. REV. at
487 ("In striking down state prohibitions on accurate price advertising by pharmacists
and lawyers, the Court explicitly inveighed against the paternalistic premises of the
restrictions, thus giving the antipaternalism principle a position of new prominence in
2004]
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same time, it has seeped into other areas of First Amendment law,
often through direct invocation of the lessons of the commercial speech
doctrine.
A puzzle is why it took the Court so long to come to its current
antipaternalist view. From 1918, the dawn of the Court's modern
First Amendment jurisprudence, until 1976 the Court never explicitly
struck down a speech regulation as impermissibly "paternalist." It is
not that the word was foreign to the Court; Justice Holmes first used
the word "paternalist" in his famous Lochner dissent.23
The answer, I think, is that free speech antipaternalism was re-
ally nothing new in 1976. The basic antipaternalist impulse had been
there all along, immanent though unarticulated in the Court's basic
approach to free speech. The Court had long been a guardian against
letting the state assume the role of guardian over the minds of the
people. In a sense, every time the Court struck down a speech regula-
tion it was saying the same thing. Of course government could not tell
citizens what to speak, hear, read, or write on the grounds that it knew
what was best for them. Denouncing paternalism as such would have
been akin to observing that the sun rises in the east. The proposition
was a truism.
The question of what to do about commercial speech, on this view,
only brought the Court back to first principles. If the state could not
otherwise restrict what citizens read or hear for paternalistic reasons,
why would such a justification be acceptable where the speech was
commercial in nature rather than political? A possible answer to this
is that government has free reign to regulate economic transactions,
even for paternalistic reasons, and commercial speech is but a step
toward those fully regulable transactions. 24 Yet the fact that govern-
ment can regulate or prohibit the underlying activity proposed or con-
templated by speech has not generally been sufficient reason to
prohibit the speech. Whatever the merits of these arguments about
protecting commercial speech, it is the case that the rise of the com-
mercial speech doctrine gave birth to a self-conscious, articulated anti-
paternalism in the realm of free speech.
first amendment doctrine."). But, noting the Court's somewhat inconsistent application
of the principle, Vincent Blasi questions whether the Court has perhaps undermined
the antipaternalism principle rather than strengthened it. Id.
23. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A] con-
stitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternal-
ism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.").




Nowhere is the asymmetry in the Constitution's treatment of pa-
ternalism more transparent than in commercial regulation. Since the
demise of Lochner v. New York2 5 the Constitution has erected no seri-
ous barrier to economic regulation. The only requirement is that the
regulation be rational, 26 which turns out to be nothing at all. When it
comes to production, the state can regulate the manufacture of a good,
determine the prices and conditions of its sale, and even ban it from
the marketplace. 27 When it comes to employment, the government
can restrict access to an occupation, set wages, hours, and other condi-
tions, and even outlaw certain professions. 28 The state can create a
monopoly, erect barriers to entry in the market, and subsidize chosen
special interests and industries. 29 Government may regulate com-
merce in all these ways and many more.
It makes no difference to the constitutionality of these regulations
of commercial acts that the justification for them is paternalistic. But
let the government attempt to regulate commercial speech and, since
1976, suddenly paternalism is the dirtiest word in the constitutional
lexicon. It is possible to imagine a set of "constitutional values" under
which "price supports, minimum wage laws, and advertising bans are
utterly indistinguishable" 30 and equally permissible, but as we shall
see it is not the scheme we have now.
For most of the Court's history a frankly paternalistic rationale
for a ban on commercial speech would not have fazed the justices. In
25. 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
26. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legisla-
tion adapted to its purpose .... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable rela-
tion to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied. . . ." Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537
(1934).
27. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1979).
28. Jackson, 65 VA. L. REV. at 32-33.
29. Id. In a decision striking down Virginia's ban on price advertising by pharma-
cists that the state said was necessary to protect pharmacists from destructive price
competition that would ultimately hurt consumers by degrading the pharmacy profes-
sion, the Court advised: "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in
other ways." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 748, 770 (1976). The state's goal of protecting pharmacists from com-
petition and thus protecting consumers from the allegedly harmful consequences of that
competition was not in question; the state's means of achieving that goal - restricting
the flow of information to consumers - were problematically paternalistic.
30. Jackson, 65 VA. L. REV. at 33.
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Ex Parte Jackson,3 1 the Court upheld a ban on circulars promoting
lotteries because "lotteries . . .are supposed to have a demoralizing
influence upon the people."32 Until 1976, justifications of that sort
were sufficient to sustain a commercial speech regulation, because
commercial speech received no First Amendment protection. 3 3 Begin-
ning with its heightened protection of advertising, however, the Court
has charted a somewhat meandering and inconsistent path toward ap-
plying the antipaternalism of its political speech cases to commercial
speech. 34
1. The antipaternalism principle is born: Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
The Supreme Court's first foray into explicit constitutional protec-
tion for commercial speech - and also its first explicit rejection of pa-
ternalism - illustrates this asymmetry. In Virginia Pharmacy, the
Court invalidated Virginia's ban on prescription-drug price advertis-
ing by pharmacists. The measure was designed in part to protect
pharmacists from what the state regarded as the destructive conse-
quences to pharmacists' professionalism that would result from price
competition. At the same time, the Court was clear that "Virginia is
free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its phar-
macists; it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in
other ways."35
A noteworthy feature of the Virginia Pharmacy litigation - and
surely a factor influencing the Court's ultimate rationale - is the
challengers to Virginia's ban were not the pharmacists upon whom the
restriction directly fell but the very consumers the law was supposed
to benefit by keeping pharmacy standards high. The consumers' in-
terests were clear: advertising would foster price competition for pre-
scription drugs, which would drive down the prices of the drugs, and
make them more affordable to consumers. The absence of regulation
had led to widely divergent prices for drugs even within the same lo-
31. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
32. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1878).
33. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
34. Martin Redish has split the Court's decisions in the commercial speech area
into "anti-paternalism" and "pro-paternalism" decisions. Redish, 81 IowA L. REV. at
611-19. Redish concludes this has left a "state of doctrinal confusion." Id. at 618. Al-
though I agree, as discussed below, that the Court's decisionmaking has been less than
consistent, it has never explicitly accepted government paternalism as a basis for
speech regulation. More importantly, its decisions in the commercial speech area since
the publication of Redish's commentary have seemed to move more uniformly in the
direction of antipaternalism.
35. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
[Vol. 37
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cale, causing some people to overpay for their drugs or to waste time
investigating prices by calling or visiting local pharmacies. 36
The Court's analysis began by affirming the First Amendment
protects listeners' - not simply speakers' - interest in receiving in-
formation and ideas. "[Where a speaker exists, as is the case here,
the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its
recipients both," wrote Justice Blackmun. 37
The question in Virginia Pharmacy was whether this interest
could extend to the information contained in commercial speech,
"which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.' 38 The
consumer-listeners did not ask for the right to hear the pharmacists'
views on abortion, or on U.S. foreign policy, or even on whether the
state should restrict price advertising. They wanted only to know, via
advertising, what price the pharmacists charged for their prescription
drugs. This was not exactly a classic concern of the First Amendment,
but it was enough for the Court to find the communication worthy of
protection.
For our purpose, however, the most significant aspect of the
Court's opinion is its rejection of the state's rationale for the advertis-
ing ban. The Court stated,"[T]he State's protectiveness of its citizens
rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in igno-
rance."39 The advertising ban "affects [professional standards] only
through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the free flow of
drug price information."40 The Court recounted the state's parade of
horribles that might arise if pharmacists were permitted to advertise:
It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who wishes to
provide low cost, and assertedly low quality, services is per-
mitted to advertise, he will be taken up on his offer by too
many unwitting customers. They will choose the low-cost,
low-quality service and drive the "professional" pharmacist
out of business. They will respond only to costly and exces-
sive advertising, and end up paying the price. They will go
from one pharmacist to another, following the discount, and
destroy the pharmacist-customer relationship. They will lose
respect for the profession because it advertises. All this is not
in their best interests, and all this can be avoided if they are
not permitted to know who is charging what.4 1
36. Id. at 754, 763-64
37. Id. at 749, 756.
38. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973).
39. Id. at 769.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
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All of the asserted harms would arise only because, according to
the state, consumers would behave badly in response to more price
information. The harmful response would work along two related
dimensions. First, consumers would make choices to maximize their
short-term interest (obtaining drugs at low cost) at the expense of
their long-term interest (quality pharmacy services). Second, individ-
uals would react rationally to maximize their own individual interests
(lower cost) even as the competition thus generated would, over time,
hurt the collective interests of all prescription drug consumers by de-
grading pharmacy service and professionalism.
Whether any of this would actually come about because of price
competition for prescription drugs is doubtful. Virginia heavily regu-
lated the professional credentials and service standards of pharma-
cists. The Court's decision left those regulations untouched. To the
extent any pharmacist failed to meet those standards, he risked hav-
ing disciplinary action taken, including possible revocation of his li-
cense, by the state pharmacy board. Further, it is at least conceivable
that some pharmacists would advertise their superior service as an
advantage and that some consumers would prefer better service to
lower price. It seems plausible that price competition might result in
both lower average service quality and lower prices. But the tradeoff
might well be worth it. For example, fierce price competition in the
grocery market has not eliminated stores that market their superior
service, selection, and cleanliness; at the same time, it has not led to a
plague of food-borne disease in stores that emphasize low cost.
The point is the state of Virginia predicted harmful consumer
choices arising from the greater availability of price information. The
remedy was to deny information to consumers in order to protect them
from themselves. In what would become one of the most quoted
passages in recent Supreme Court history, and would set the tone for
a quarter-century of antipaternalist doctrine, the Justices rejected the
state's remedy:
There is, of course, an alternative to this highly paternalistic
approach. That alternative is to assume that this informa-
tion is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of commu-
nication rather than to close them.4 2
Faced with a choice between Virginia's "highly paternalistic ap-
proach" of denying information to people for their own good and trust-
ing them with that same information, a reasonable person might
demand empirical data about the actual effects of price advertising on
42. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
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prices and professionalism. She might conclude either paternalism or
its opposite would serve the individual and collective good better. But
for the Court this kind of inquiry need not be performed, because the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution eliminated one of
the options:
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of sup-
pressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is
freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us.
Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it
wishes of its pharmacists; it may subsidize them or protect
them from competition in other ways. [citation omitted] But
it may not do so by keeping the public in ignorance of the en-
tirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists are
offering.4 3
These two passages, which have turned up in numerous First
Amendment contexts, set up three themes in the Court's antipaternal-
ism jurisprudence. The first is an implicit distrust of the state's actual
purpose in enacting the law at issue. Note that the Court here refers
to Virginia's effort to "subsidize" pharmacies and to "protect them from
competition," not to its stated goal to protect consumers from the indi-
vidually or collectively harmful consequences of their own choices.
One wonders whether the Court suspected that Virginia's stated pa-
ternalistic concern for consumers may have been pretextual. In other
words, Virginia's legislators may have simply surrendered to the will
of the pharmacy industry as represented by established pharmacies.
which preferred to avoid strong intra-industry competition. On this
point, it is notable that no pharmacy challenged a speech restriction
that was, in the first instance, a direct restriction on pharmacies. It is
plausible that pharmacies, acting collectively in their own interests,
lobbied to have the freedom to advertise prices taken away from them.
The restriction helped keep the cartel going strong. What was for-
mally a speech restriction may really have been intended as a dis-
guised subsidy to pharmacies extracted from Virginia's consumers in
the form of higher prescription drug prices.
A second theme apparent here is the Court's disdain for "keeping
the public in ignorance" about important issues. This suggests the
Court's strong preference for a "more is better" approach to the availa-
bility of information. Where the state takes a "less is better" approach
to information availability, by restricting its dissemination, the Court
is quick to see impermissible paternalism.
A third theme is the Court's generally non-consequentialist ap-
proach to antipaternalism. Antipaternalism is not justified on the
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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grounds that it necessarily produces better social or individual results
in every case. It may or may not. We hope it does and we think it
does, but we do not really know. This agnosticism about the actual
consequences of the free flow of information and ideas is familiar in
First Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Holmes wrote the First
Amendment presupposes that:
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon some imperfect knowledge.44
For Holmes, free speech was an uncertain wager. For the Court
in Virginia Pharmacy, trusting citizens with information was a simi-
larly uncertain wager. The wager could not be justified based on the
probability that it would turn out right. Rather, antipaternalism is
justified because it is better in itself. It is better as a matter of princi-
ple, without regard to the consequences it produces in particular
cases. It respects the dignity and autonomy of adults, who have a
right granted by the First Amendment not to be "kept in ignorance" by
the state.
Importantly, the Court did identify some limits on its new recog-
nition of the constitutional status of commercial speech. The Court
carefully noted the First Amendment does not protect false, deceptive,
or misleading commercial speech.4 5 The Court stated, "We foresee no
obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem."46 The
State was free to ensure "that the stream of commercial information
flow cleanly as well as freely."4 7 Much of the Court's post-Virginia
Pharmacy commercial speech jurisprudence has, not surprisingly, in-
volved assertions by the state that the advertising it seeks to prohibit
is deceptive or misleading.
The Court also noted the transactions proposed in the advertising
(purchasing prescription drugs) were not illegal, and that "special
problems" might arise in applying the doctrine to the broadcast me-
dia.48 Finally, the Court suggested special attention to the possibility
of consumer confusion and deception might arise for advertising by
certain kinds of professionals, like doctors and lawyers, who do not
44. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
45. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 772.
48. Id. at 772-73.
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dispense standardized products. 49 I will address the line of cases
emerging from this qualification in a separate section.
The Court's willingness to entertain these exceptions and limita-
tions to the commercial speech doctrine is puzzling because the Court
seems to allow room for paternalistic regulation of speech in the inter-
ests of consumers. The Court suggests consumers should be given
only truthful, non-misleading information about products and services
that are largely standardized and entirely legal. In other words, con-
sumers can be trusted to react appropriately only where the informa-
tion is straightforward and the decisions relatively mechanical. This
may not seem like a very robust antipaternalism. I will assess these
difficulties for the antipaternalism principle below.
2. The antipaternalism principle after Virginia Pharmacy: rise
In the quarter-century since Virginia Pharmacy the Court's com-
mercial speech doctrine has taken a sometimes unpredictable path.
This has included validating state regulation of speech that closely
resembled in purpose the law invalidated in Virginia Pharmacy. But
the Court has never backed away, at least rhetorically, from anti-
paternalism. And recent decisions have called into question the vital-
ity of earlier cases accepting arguable paternalistic justifications for
speech restrictions.
The Court strongly and unanimously reiterated its rejection of pa-
ternalism in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro,50 its first post-
Virginia Pharmacy treatment of the commercial speech doctrine. In
an effort to stem a tide of "white flight," Willingboro, New Jersey, en-
acted an ordinance barring the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on
real property. 51 In the 1970s, the proportion of Willingboro residents
who were white began to decline. The proportion of nonwhites rose
from 11.7% of the town's population in the 1960's to 18.2% in 1973.
The decline in the white population was attributed to "panic selling"
by whites who feared the town was becoming all black. One real es-
tate agent reported "the reason 80% of the sellers gave for their deci-
sion to sell was that 'the whole town was for sale, and they didn't want
to be caught in any bind."' 5 2
Whites were afraid an influx of black residents would cause a de-
cline in their property values. To avoid getting left behind as their
home values declined, many decided to sell. Their decisions, of course,
49. Id. at 773 n.25.
50. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). Then, Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the consid-
eration or decision of the case.
51. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 86 (1977).
52. Linmark Assoc., 431 U.S. at 88.
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contributed further to an atmosphere of panic selling and declining
residential property values, a cycle that fed on its own momentum.
When several real estate agents told the town council that 30-35% of
buyers came to them after seeing an agent's "For Sale" or "Sold" sign,
the council decided to act by banning use of the signs.5 3 Surveys in
two areas of the town showed strong popular support for the
restriction.5 4
The Court determined Willingboro had banned the signs "because
it fears their 'primary' effect - that they will cause those receiving
the information to act upon it." 5 5 The Court agreed racial integration
in housing was an important national goal, but doubted the ordinance
would actually preserve integration. 56
Beyond this practical failing in the ordinance, the Court found a
deeper flaw in the law's paternalism:
The constitutional defect in this ordinance, however, is far
more basic .... The Council has sought to restrict the free
flow of these data because it fears that otherwise homeown-
ers will make decisions inimical to what the Council views as
the homeowners' self-interest and the corporate interest of
the township: they will choose to leave town.5 7
The Court worried about the consequences of allowing the town to
withhold information so important to buyers and sellers, based on citi-
zens' presumed inability to deal rationally with it:
If dissemination of this information can be restricted, then
every locality in the country can suppress any facts that re-
flect poorly on the locality, so long as a plausible claim can be
made that disclosure would cause the recipients of the infor-
mation to act "irrationally."5 8
The Court's characterization of the town's ordinance as an effort
to curb individual irrationality says a great deal about the Court's hos-
tility to speech regulation designed to protect individuals from
themselves.
But as a characterization of the town's rationale for the ban on
"For Sale" signs, it is incorrect. As to each individual citizen, "panic
selling" may be entirely rational in that it attempts to capture as
much of the falling value of the individual's home as possible in a de-
clining market. The irrationality of panic selling is collective, not indi-
vidual. Willingboro's ordinance was an attempt to deal with the
53. Id.
54. Id. at 90.
55. Id. at 94.
56. Id. at 94-95.




collectively irrational consequences of a series of individually rational
decisions. 59 The same was true of the price advertising restriction in
Virginia Pharmacy. What motivated the restriction in each instance
was not a paternalistic fear that individuals would fail to act in their
rational best interests but that, in fact, they would act in their own
individual best interests to the detriment of the collective. That is, the
state's concern was almost the opposite of a paternalistic one as to
each individual citizen.
The Court was concerned, however, that the government was be-
ing paternalistic as to the collective. The constitutional infirmity was
that Willingboro's (and Virginia's) method of solving the problem (re-
stricting the information readily available to citizens) was an imper-
missible means of dealing with the problem under the
antipaternalism principle because it limited information in the collec-
tive's best interests, not that it was an attempt to deal with individual
irrationality. As it was in Virginia Pharmacy, the Linmark Court
noted the state could not "enable its citizens to find their self-interest
[by] deny[ing] them information that is neither false nor
misleading."60
Much of Linmark Associates seems a replay of the issues at work
in Virginia Pharmacy. There is the same implicit distrust of the un-
derlying motive of the regulation, which was arguably more about pre-
serving racial homogeneity than about promoting racial integration.
After all, at the time the ordinance passed, the town was still more
than four-fifths white. There is the same disdain for the idea of keep-
ing citizens ignorant for their own good. And there is the same disre-
gard for the actual consequences of antipaternalism: the Court offered
no prediction about what might happen to racial integration or home
prices if citizens were once again allowed to display "For Sale" signs
on their lawns.
But Linmark Associates adds two important wrinkles to the anti-
paternalism principle. First, the Court suggested that restricting pub-
lic access to information was impermissible where counter-speech
59. A similar rationale will underlie every case where the state attempts to deal
with collective problems by controlling information that reaches individuals. As then
Justice Rehnquist noted in a case involving a state's attempt to curb energy consump-
tion by restricting a public energy provider's advertising:
With respect to governmental policies that do not offer immediate tangible ben-
efits and the success of which depends on incremental contributions by all
members of society, such as would seem to be the case with energy conserva-
tion, a strong argument can be made that while a policy may be in the longrun
interest of all members of society, some rational individuals will perceive it to
their own shortrun advantage to not act in accordance with that policy.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557,
594 n.5 (1980) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting).
60. Linmark Assoc., 431 U.S. 97.
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would be available to inform citizens' decision-making. Thus, the
Court quoted Justice Brandeis' famous concurrence in Whitney v. Cal-
ifornia,6 1 emphasizing the utility of counter-speech, as a safeguard
underlying the antipaternalism principle: "If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not en-
forced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression." 62 Implicit
in this is the idea that where counter-speech will be unavailable, or
untimely, even paternalistic speech regulation is permissible.
A second qualification on the antipaternalism principle that
arises from Linmark Associates is that while government may not re-
duce the amount of information available to the public it may take
steps to increase the amount of information available. I will call the
former an information-denying strategy and the latter an information-
providing strategy. The Court was careful to note Willingboro was not
"defenseless" in its effort to end white flight. "The township obviously
remains free to continue 'the process of education' it has already be-
gun."63 The town could, for example, "give widespread publicity -
through 'Not for Sale' signs or other methods - to the number of
whites remaining in Willingboro."6 4 Thus, the town itself could fur-
nish the counter-speech necessary to curb the evil of panic selling.
The Court's willingness not simply to tolerate - but to propose -
such an alternative in Linmark Associates suggests that while the an-
tipaternalism principle forbids an information-denying strategy to
promote citizens' best interests, it does not forbid an information-pro-
viding strategy to accomplish the same end.
In some tension with Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark Associates
is the Court's decision in Friedman v. Rogers,65 which upheld a state's
ban on the use of a trade name in connection with an optometry prac-
tice.66 The state defended the law on what looks like a paternalistic
ground: trade names will be used to mislead the public by, for exam-
ple, attracting consumers to a trade name reflecting the reputation of
a particular optometrist no longer associated with the practice. 6 7
The Court was careful not to rest its decision solely on this argua-
bly paternalistic rationale. Rather, it held trade names have "no in-
trinsic meaning," that is, they "convey . . . no information about the
61. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).




65. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
66. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1979).
67. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13.
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price and nature of the services offered by an optometrist .... ,"68 This
distinguished the Friedman from Virginia Pharmacy, where consum-
ers sought factual and truthful information about prices. On the other
hand, the optometrists' effort to convey "factual information associ-
ated with trade names may be communicated freely and explicitly to
the public."6 9
The Court's next consideration of the commercial speech doctrine
came in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York, 70 the opinion which settled on a four-pronged
test for the protection of commercial speech.7 1 At issue was a regula-
tion of the New York Public Service Commission banning all promo-
tional advertising by an electric utility.7 2 The regulation was
designed to conserve energy by dampening the demand for it. Promo-
tional advertising, argued the Commission, would have the effect of
increasing demand. 73
The energy conservation problem addressed by the Commission's
speech regulation was identical in form to the destructive competition
problem the state legislature faced in Virginia Pharmacy and the
panic selling problem Willingboro faced in Linmark Associates: ra-
tional behavior by individuals in response to advertising would work
to the community's collective detriment. And the Commission's re-
sponse to the problem was identical in form to the state legislature's
68. Id. at 12. On this point, the Court probably understated the informational
value of trade names to consumers. Over time, consumers familiarize themselves with
trade names and the goods, prices, and quality of services associated with the names.
This substantially reduces their search costs for goods and services. Id. at 22-23 (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting the deposition testimony of
professor and economist Lee Kenneth Benham).
69. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 16.
70. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
71. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The Court outlined the test as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression... concern[s] lawful
activity and [is not] misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.
Id. There has been grumbling on the Court about this test, especially from those in-
clined to give stronger protection to commercial speech. See Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in the judgment); 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510-14 (joint opinion of Stevens, Ken-
nedy, and Ginsburg); Id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
There have also been hints that the test might one day be abandoned. See Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 539-40 (2001). However, it remains good law.
72. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 558.
73. Id. at 568 ("The Commission argues.., that the State's interest in conserving
energy is sufficient to support suppression of advertising designed to increase consump-
tion of electricity.").
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in Virginia Pharmacy and the town's in Linmark Associates: the Com-
mission took on the role of central decisionmaker to preserve the col-
lective interest by restricting speech.
The Court's response to this solution echoed its earlier responses:
"In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected the
'highly paternalistic' view that government has complete power to
suppress or regulate commercial speech."7 4 The Court added: "Even
when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the rel-
evant facts, the First Amendment presumes some accurate informa-
tion is better than no information at all."7 5
As it had in Linmark Associates, the Court suggested an informa-
tion-providing strategy as a means by which the government might
achieve its goals. The Commission could seek to influence energy con-
sumption by "requir[ing] that the advertisements include information
about the relative efficiency and expense of the offered service, both
under current conditions and for the foreseeable future."76 Other
methods presumably included direct controls on energy consumption
and added taxes for overuse of electricity. The Court's response sug-
gests an approach under which the state may regulate directly to solve
the collective detriment problem but not indirectly through the control
of information. The first is permissible paternalism; the second is im-
permissible paternalism. In short, the Court held the total advertis-
ing ban unconstitutional as a "suppression of speech."7 7
While superficially another victory for the antipaternalism princi-
ple, Central Hudson contained the seed of a brief retreat. Instead of
dismissing out of hand the Commission's attempt to dampen electric-
ity demand by restricting information, the Court concluded only that
the proposed advertising in fact "would cause no net increase in total
energy use" and that the Commission had not proved "a more limited
restriction on the content of promotional advertising would not serve
adequately the State's interests."778 The negative implication was
that a restriction on advertising might be approved as a method of
dampening demand if in some future case the government could prove
such a connection. 79 But the fact the connection could be proved
would not relieve the paternalism of such a regulatory approach.
74. Id. at 562.
75. Id. at 570.
76. Id. at 571-72.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 570.
79. Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. Ky. L. REV. 553, 560
(1997) (noting the court's dictum in Central Hudson suggests "the propriety of a pater-
nalistic and manipulative rationale for regulating commercial expression").
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In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,8 0 the Court upheld the
city's ban on billboards displaying commercial messages;8 1 however,
the Court struck down the ban as applied to billboards displaying non-
commercial messages.8 2 The city's purpose for the ban was "to elimi-
nate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about by
distracting sign displays' and 'to preserve and improve the appearance
of the City .... ,,s3 The plurality opinion reaffirmed the antipaternal-
ism principle born in Virginia Pharmacy: "A State may not completely
suppress the dissemination of truthful information about an entirely
lawful activity merely because it is fearful of that information's effect
upon its disseminators and its recipients."8 4
But one of the city's stated goals - traffic safety - might seem
impermissibly paternalistic in that it justifies speech regulation be-
cause the government is fearful of the effect the speech will have on
recipients. It will distract drivers and pedestrians, causing traffic ac-
cidents. Yet, the Court was careful to say San Diego was "regulating
the noncommunicative aspects of a medium of expression," not the in-
formation the billboard advertisers sought to transmit.8 5 Billboards
are large and contain, by design, eye-catching advertisements quite
apart from any substantive message they express.
The antipaternalism principle, as refined in Metromedia, prohib-
its restriction only on the communicative aspects of speech. It is the
communicative aspect of speech that provides information to the re-
cipient necessary for decision-making. San Diego's justifications for
the billboard ban - traffic safety and aesthetics - were unrelated to
the suppression of information, and thus did not represent an imper-
missible information-denying strategy under the antipaternalism
principle. A different case would have been presented if the city of
San Diego had attempted to ban advertising about a subject - say,
ads for the sale of beer - because it feared the contents of such ads
would encourage liquor consumption.
Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Products Corp.8 6 was the Court's last sig-
nificant commercial speech decision in the initial post-Virginia Phar-
80. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
81. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512 (1981).
82. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 520-21. This distinction would not survive full
First Amendment protection for commercial speech.
83. Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 493.
84. Id. at 492, 505.
85. Id. at 517 (emphasis added). See also Id. at 554 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part)
("I can find no suggestion on the face of the ordinance that San Diego is attempting to
influence public opinion or to limit debate on particular issues."); Id. at 562 (Burger, C.
J., dissenting) ("The city has not undertaken to determine, paternalistically, 'what in-
formation is relevant to self-government.'").
86. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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macy period. In Youngs Drugs, the Court struck down a federal
statute that forbade the unsolicited mailing of advertisements for con-
traceptives. The government offered two justifications for the law.
One was that the statute aided parents' efforts to control their chil-
dren's access to sensitive sexual materials.8 7 This justification was
not paternalistic, but the Court found the law was not sufficiently tai-
lored to serve it.
The second justification, shielding recipients from material that
are likely to find offensive, was paternalistic.8 8 The fact that speech
may be offensiveness to some people does not, by itself, justify its sup-
pression. Thus, the government could not regulate speech based on
the recipients' own presumed interest in avoiding offense. It is up to
adults, not the government, to decide what offends them and if neces-
sary to take "'the short, though regular, journey from mail box to
trash can .... ,,,s9 Youngs Drugs stands for the proposition, therefore,
that government may not regulate speech because of its primary effect
on recipients. 90
3. The antipaternalism principle after Virginia Pharmacy: retreat
By the time the Court decided Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co. of P.R.,91 it seemed the antipaternalism principle was
on solid ground. Yet in Posadas, the Court upheld a ban on advertis-
ing by gambling casinos justified by the state as a way to reduce de-
mand for casino gambling in Puerto Rico, along with the attendant
evils of excessive gambling like crime.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the 5-4 majority reasoned that the
state had the greater power to ban the underlying activity (gambling),
even though it had not chosen to do so; thus, it must possess the lesser
power to ban advertising about that activity. The Court stated that
"[Ilt is precisely because the government could have enacted a whole-
sale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for the
government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the conduct, but
reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising."9 2 This rea-
soning was squarely at odds with antipaternalism principle developed
by the Court since Virginia Pharmacy, forbidding precisely this infor-
mation-denying strategy as a means to accomplish the state's- end of
87. Bolger v. Young Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983).
88. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71.
89. Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y.), affd 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
90. See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975).
91. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).




changing individual decision-making. Moreover, because the state
has the power to ban almost all commercial transactions, except those
with some independent constitutional protection (e.g., abortion, sell-
ing rosaries), it threatened to undo the entire commercial speech
doctrine.
The majority also rejected the view, earlier embraced by the Court
in cases like Linmark Associates, that the state could deal with the
problem of excessive gambling by promoting counter-speech to dis-
courage it.93
The Court continued its retreat from protection for commercial
speech - and its commitment to the antipaternalism principle - in
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.9 4 In Edge Broadcasting, the
Court upheld a federal law banning broadcasted lottery advertise-
ments except by television stations licensed to states that conduct
lotteries.
The Court accepted Congress's paternalistic rationale for the law:
that it would have the effect of decreasing demand for lotteries in
states that prohibited them. "If there is an immediate connection be-
tween advertising and demand," declared the Court, "and the federal
regulation decreases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of
decreasing demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced."9 5 This
reasoning ignored the dictate of the antipaternalism principle that the
efficacy of an information-denying strategy is irrelevant to its consti-
tutionality under the First Amendment.
Justice Stevens had had enough. In dissent, he rejected the
Court's easy acceptance of paternalism. Congress had not chosen to
regulate lottery advertisements to eliminate misleading statements,
nor had it opted to promote "more speech, such as warnings or educa-
tional information about gambling."
Rather, the United States has selected the most intrusive,
and dangerous, form of regulation possible - a ban on truth-
ful information regarding a lawful activity imposed for the
purpose of manipulating, through ignorance, the consumer
choices of some of its citizens. Unless justified by a truly sub-
stantial governmental interest, this extreme, and extremely
paternalistic, measure surely cannot withstand scrutiny
under the First Amendment. 9 6
93. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. at 346.
94. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
95. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. at 434 (1993).
96. Id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also relied on Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), a pre-Virginia Pharmacy decision, in which the Court




Within three years the Court would return to the antipaternalism
principle with a vengeance.
4. The antipaternalism principle after Virginia Pharmacy:
reaffirmation
Two years after Edge Broadcasting, the Court struck down a com-
mercial speech regulation in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.9 7 The fed-
eral law at issue prohibited beer labels from displaying alcohol
content, a regulation justified as an effort to prevent consumer-driven
"strength wars."
The Court did not question the government's avowedly paternalis-
tic rationale, clearly at odds with the Court's early commercial speech
decisions, that "restricting disclosure of information regarding a par-
ticular product characteristic will decrease the extent to which con-
sumers will select the product on the basis of that characteristic."
98
Congress legitimately feared such strength wars "could lead to greater
alcoholism and its attendant social costs."9 9 However, the Court con-
cluded Congress' regulatory scheme to forestall strength wars was so
riddled with exceptions and loopholes that it suffered an "overall
irrationality."10 0
At the same time, the Court recommended less intrusive alterna-
tive regulations that were both paternalistic and non-paternalistic.
Congress could, for example, directly regulate the alcohol content of
beer.910 1 Such a regulation would not offend First Amendment anti-
paternalism. More troubling to the antipaternalism principle, the
Court suggested Congress could "prohibit[ ] marketing efforts empha-
sizing high alcohol strength."10 2 Most troubling of all, the Court sug-
gested Congress could completely ban displays of alcohol content on
malt liquors, "the segment of the market that allegedly is threatened
with a strength war."10 3
Justice Stevens, concurring only in the judgment, once again
chided the Court for tolerating the government's paternalistic justifi-
cation for the labeling ban. "Although some regulations of statements
Bigelow is not about a woman's constitutionally protected right to terminate a
pregnancy. It is about paternalism, and informational protectionism. It is
about one state's interference with its citizens' fundamental constitutional
right to travel in a state of enlightenment, not government-induced ignorance.
Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
98. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 484 (1995).
99. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 485.
100. Id. at 488.
101. Id. at 490.
102. Id. at 490-91.
103. Id. at 491.
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about alcohol content that increase consumer awareness would be en-
tirely proper," Justice Stevens noted, affirming the constitutionality of
an information-providing strategy, "this statutory provision is nothing
more than an attempt to blindfold the public. 1 0 4 Rubin was thus a
transitional decision on the way from the Court's seeming retreat from
the antipaternalism principle in Posadas and Edge Broadcasting to its
reaffirmation of the principle in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land,10 5 a year later.
In 44 Liquormart, the Court struck down a Rhode Island law ban-
ning advertisements of retail liquor prices. The state's aim in imple-
menting the ban was to reduce alcohol consumption. 10 6 The ban
would discourage consumption, according to the state, by indirectly
elevating the cost of alcohol to consumers (by suppressing price com-
petition and raising consumers' search costs).' 0 7
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion canvassed the Court's commer-
cial speech decisions, which rejected "a State's paternalistic assump-
tion the public will use truthful, nonmisleading commercial
information unwisely . . . ."10 Bans on truthful and non-deceptive
advertising usually rest solely on the offensive assumption the public
will respond 'irrationally' to the truth,"'0 9 wrote Justice Stevens. "The
First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations
that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government per-
ceives to be their own good."" 0
The plurality opinion identified two related harms arising from
the state's paternalistic ban. The first is that it deprives consumers of
information important to them. The second is that it "shield[s] the
State's anti-gambling policy from the public scrutiny that more direct,
nonspeech regulation would draw.""' Thus, paternalistic speech reg-
ulations obscure the government's real interest - manipulating the
public and at the same time undermining democratic accountability.
Simply put, "a state legislature does not have the broad discretion to
suppress truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic pur-
poses the Posadas majority was willing to tolerate."" 12
104. Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
105. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
106. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 504, 504 n.14 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 524 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
108. Id. at 484, 497.
109. Id. at 484, 503 (citing Linmark Assoc., 431 U.S. at 96).
110. Id. at 503.
111. Id. at 509 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
478 U.S. 328, 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
112. Id. at 510. The plurality expressly rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
argument advanced in Poasadas on the grounds that Abanning speech may sometimes
prove far more intrusive than banning conduct." Id. at 511. "As the entire Court appar-
ently now agrees, the statements in the Posadas opinion [relying on the greater-in-
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As strongly antipaternalist as this was, the majority was still
willing to indulge the possibility that a price advertising ban might be
constitutional if it would "significantly reduce alcohol consump-
tion."1 13 Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion, indicated he would
go farther in the direction of antipaternalism. Rejecting the Central
Hudson test where the state's interest "is to keep legal users of a prod-
uct or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the mar-
ketplace," Justice Thomas would have preferred to declare such a
justification "per se illegitimate." 1 4 He offered the most full-throated
defense of the antipaternalism principle yet from a member of the
Court:
In case after case following Virginia Bd. Of Pharmacy, the
Court, and individual Members of the Court, have continued
to stress the importance of free dissemination of information
about commercial choices in a market economy; the anti-
paternalistic premises of the First Amendment; the impropri-
ety of manipulating consumer choices or public opinion
through the suppression of accurate 'commercial' informa-
tion; the near impossibility of severing 'commercial' speech
from speech necessary to democratic decisionmaking; and the
dangers of permitting the government to do covertly what it
might not have been able to muster the political support to do
openly. 1 15
In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United
States,116 the Court unanimously struck down a federal ban on broad-
cast advertising for casino gambling in Louisiana and Mississippi,
where casino gambling is legal. The government advanced two inter-
ests in support of the law: (1) reducing the social costs connected with
casino gambling, and (2) assisting states that have banned gambling
within their own borders. 1 7 As to the first interest, the government
asserted "'promotional' broadcast advertising concerning casino gam-
bling increases demand for such gambling, which in turn increases the
amount of casino gambling that produces those social costs." 1 8 The
cludes-the-lesser argument] on which Rhode Island relies are no longer persuasive." Id.
at 513.
113. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 505. Justice Thomas criticized this approach
since it "seems to imply that if the State had been more successful at keeping consumers
ignorant and thereby decreasing their consumption, then the restriction might have
been upheld." Id. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
114. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in judgment) (citing numerous decisions and opinions of individual justices).
115. Id. at 520 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
116. 527 U.S. 173 (1999).
117. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 185.
118. Id. at 189.
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government argued compulsive gamblers were especially vulnerable
to such broadcast advertising. 1 19
This reasoning was plainly paternalistic since it justified a re-
striction on speech as a means of manipulating consumer choice. A
citation to Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark Associates, and 44 Li-
quormart - all of which rejected as paternalistic identical reasoning
for speech restrictions - would have disposed of the issue. Instead,
the Court faulted the government's advertising regulatory scheme for
being "so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Govern-
ment cannot hope to exonerate it."12° The problem the Court identi-
fied was not the law's paternalism, but its failure to be comprehensive.
The decision thus echoed the fact-bound holding in Rubin, which
struck down a ban on alcohol content on beer labels not because the
regulation was paternalistic but because of its "overall
irrationality." 12 1
The Court ended its opinion, however, on a familiar antipaternal-
ist note: The government "cannot overcome the presumption that the
speaker and the audience, not the Government, should be left to as-
sess the value of accurate and nonmisleading information about law-
ful conduct."1 22 Additionally, at least six of the eight justices firmly
rejected the reasoning of Posadas that because the government had
the unexercised power to ban the activity it necessarily had the power
to ban advertising about the activity.123
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 12 4 the Court struck down fed-
eral restrictions on tobacco advertising designed to reduce underage
use of tobacco. One of the regulations prohibited outdoor tobacco ad-
vertising within 1,000 feet of a school or playground, which effectively
meant no such advertising would be allowed in 87% to 91% of the com-
munity.1 25 The Court held this regulation had the effect of unduly
interfering with right of adults to receive truthful information about a
legal product. "[T]he governmental interest in protecting children
from harmful materials does not justify an unnecessarily broad sup-
pression of speech addressed to adults."1 2 6 In short, "a speech regula-
tion cannot unduly impinge on the speaker's ability to propose a
119. Id.
120. Id. at 190.
121. Rubin, 514 U.S. at 488.
122. Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, 527 U.S. at 195.
123. Id. at 193. This followed a similar rejection of the greater-power-includes-the-
lesser-power logic of Posadas in 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 509-11 (Stevens, J., plural-
ity opinion), Id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
124. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
125. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561-62 (2001).




commercial transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to obtain
information about products."1 2 7
Finally, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center,128 the
Court struck down a provision of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 that exempted compounded drugs from the
FDA's standard drug approval requirements as long as the drug-prov-
iders refrained from advertising or promoting particular compounded
drugs. Defending its law, the government by now had learned the an-
tipaternalist lesson taught by the preceding commercial speech cases.
It did not offer the frankly paternalist rationale that the advertising
restriction was necessary to prevent patients from demanding and ob-
taining drugs they do not need. However, Justice Breyer's dissent did
conjecture such a rationale could support the restriction. 12 9
The Court found this hypothetical justification paternalistic and
forcefully rejected it:
Aside from the fact that this concern rests on the questiona-
ble assumption that doctors would prescribe unnecessary
medications . . ., this concern amounts to a fear that people
would make bad decisions if given truthful information about
compounded drugs. We have previously rejected the notion
that the Government has an interest in preventing the dis-
semination of truthful commercial information in order to
prevent members of the public from making bad decisions
with the information. 130
The Court then quoted, in full, the antipaternalism passage from
its Virginia Pharmacy decision. 13 1 Thus, the majority appears in its
most recent commercial speech decision to have returned to the anti-
paternalist roots of the doctrine.
C. PROFEssIoNAL ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION
In the commercial-speech contexts of professional advertising and
solicitation, antipaternalism has also been a common if somewhat in-
consistent theme. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,132 a decision that
extended the reach of Virginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down a
ban on an attorney advertisement containing truthful information
about routine legal services. A claimed state interest in the case was
127. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
128. 2002 WL 737506, 122 S. Ct. 1497 (2002).
129. Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 122 S. Ct. 1497, 1512 (2002)
("There is considerable evidence that consumer oriented advertising will create strong
consumer-driven demand for a particular drug.").
130. Thompson, 122 S. Ct. at 1507.
131. Id. at 1503.
132. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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to prevent public confusion about attorneys' prices and services. Quot-
ing the antipaternalism passage from Virginia Pharmacy, the Court
advised the state's concern could be met by non-paternalistic means,
rather than by "[keeping] the public in ignorance.' 3 3
The state's argument that attorneys would provide only incom-
plete information to consumers, said the Court, "assumes that the
public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of adver-
tising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted
with correct but incomplete information."1 3 4 To the extent the ads
will contain omissions, "the preferred remedy is more disclosure,
rather than less. 1 3 5 Specifically, the state bar should assume the role
of informing a naive public about how to "place advertising in its
proper perspective.' 3 6 As in the commercial speech context, the
Court was urging the more-is-better approach to information available
to the public.
In Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
Illinois,137 the Court reversed a judgment of censure against an attor-
ney for noting a trial attorney certification on his letterhead. A plural-
ity of the Court rejected the state's argument some consumers might
be misled by the use of the certification: "We reject the paternalistic
assumption that the recipients of petitioner's letterhead are no more
discriminating than the audience for children's television.' 38 Even if
some consumers may be misled, the Court held, that does not justify
keeping all consumers in the dark. And it certainly does not justify
treating adults like children when it comes to deciding what informa-
tion they may receive.
In response to Justice O'Connor's dissenting argument consumers
lack "sophistication concerning legal services,"' 39 and would confuse a
national certification for state certification, the Court gave a familiar
antipaternalist reply: "We prefer to assume that the average con-
sumer, with or without knowledge of the legal profession, can under-
stand a statement that certification by a national organization is not
certification by the State, and can decide what, if any, value to accord
this information."140 As in its many antipaternalist commercial
speech decisions emphasizing information-providing strategies, the
Court replied the appropriate First Amendment way to reduce the
133. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977).
134. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75.
135. Id. at 375.
136. Id.
137. 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
138. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 105
(1990).
139. Peel, 496 U.S. at 124 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 106 n.13.
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chance of confusion would be for the state to require that additional
disclosures be made. The antipaternalist cast of Peel, in both rhetoric
and substance, is clear.1
4 1
The Court arguably took a step back from the implications of its
antipaternalism principle in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,142 even
as it explicitly denied doing so. The Court upheld a state bar rule
prohibiting personal injury lawyers from sending targeted, di-
rect-mail solicitation to victims for 30 days after an accident. 14 3 The
state bar was concerned victims would be offended by such appeals
and thus think less of the legal profession.
144
The majority held the rule was primarily a way of protecting the
legal profession's reputation, not of avoiding recipient's offense in the
abstract. The Court took pains to point out this was not the paternal-
istic rationale of protecting citizens from the primary effect of the
speech, distinguishing Youngs Drugs on the grounds it involved a pa-
ternalistic primary-effect rationale. 14 5 The state's concern was not
with the offense to recipients of solicitation, "but with the demonstra-
ble detrimental effects that such 'offense' has on the profession it regu-
lates."1 4 6 According to the majority: "There is an obvious difference
between situations in which the government acts in its own interests,
or on behalf of entities it regulates, and situations in which the gov-
ernment is motivated primarily by paternalism."14
7
The Florida Bar Court introduces a puzzle for the antipaternal-
ism principle. It is inescapable that the harm to be prevented through
speech regulation - damage to the reputation of the legal profession
- would come about only through the negative reaction of those who
received the prohibited solicitations ("listeners"). The mechanism for
the harm, then, is listener reaction. But the difference between Flor-
ida Bar and, say, Virginia Pharmacy (where listener response might
also lead to harms the state sought to prevent) is that the state regu-
lates speech in what it regards as the best interests of a regulated
entity (the legal profession), not in listeners' best interests.
As long as the state can characterize its ultimate concern as being
about something other than listeners' best interests, it may under
Florida Bar regulate speech to prevent harm that comes about be-
cause of listeners' reaction to the speech. The problem is that, if Flor-
ida Bar is taken seriously, it would allow the state to claim in almost
141. Redish, 81 IowA L. REV. at 612.
142. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
143. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
144. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 625.
145. Id. at 630-31.
146. Id. at 631.
147. Id. at 631 n.2.
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every case it was regulating speech only in the interest of preventing
some downstream harm that starts with a negative listener reaction.
This is a problem, I think, for free speech doctrine generally. But it is
not a problem for the antipaternalism principle, which only rules out a
certain form of state rationale for speech regulation - that is, one
that offers speech regulation as a way of serving the citizen's own best
interests. Ruling out that rationale, even if the state ultimately comes
up with a different justification for the same regulation, at least has
the advantage of forcing the state to establish some link between the
ultimate harm and the negative listener reaction. This will not al-
ways be easy to prove. On the other hand, if the state were free to
argue in every case a speech regulation served listeners' own inter-
ests, the connection between the state's justification and its regulation
would always be a tight one, surviving close scrutiny.
Florida Bar, in any event, may be a case that can be written off as
dealing with a subject near and dear to the justices' hearts - the legal
profession - and thus having little force outside that particular con-
text. In Edenfield v. Fane,14 8 on the other hand, the Court held un-
constitutional a state ban on in-person solicitation by certified public
accountants. The rationale for doing so was classically antipaternal-
ist: "The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.
Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth. But
the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the govern-
ment, assess the value of the information presented." 14 9
D. POLITICAL PARTIES
In Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,1 50
the Court struck down a state law barring political parties from en-
dorsing candidates in party primaries; dictating the organization of a
party's governing body; limiting a party chair's term; and requiring
the chair to rotate between northern and southern California. The
state supported its restrictions as a method of preventing internal
party dissension and factionalism. 151 Thus, the state justified its
speech restrictions on the party by reference to the best interests of
the party itself.
148. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
149. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). This statement undermines the
claim, sometimes made, that the Court classifies some speech as low-value and some as
high-value for purposes of protecting it.
150. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).




The Court called this a "highly paternalistic approach limiting
what people may hear" akin to the restriction in Virginia Phar-
macy.1 5 2 Indeed, the regulation was worse because it involved state
censorship of "the political speech a political party shares with its
members." 15 3 Regarding the state's reasoning that, without the re-
striction on party endorsements, the party would endanger its own
general election prospects by contributing to intraparty friction, the
Court was decidedly opposed to such paternalism. "[E]ven if a ban on
endorsements saves a political party from pursuing self-destructive
acts," reasoned the Court, "that would not justify a State substituting
its judgment for that of the party."1 54 The Court also rejected a sec-
ond, paternalistic justification that the regulations were necessary to
protect voters from confusion and undue influence. The Court pro-
claimed a state's argument it was "enhancing the ability of its citi-
zenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to
them must be viewed with some skepticism."' 5 5
Two other cases involving the regulation of political parties have
raised serious antipatenalism concerns. In Renne v. Geary,156 the
Court dismissed as nonjusticiable a challenge to a state prohibition on
party endorsements of candidates in non-partisan races. The Court
noted, however, the free speech issues raised in the parties' briefs had
"fundamental and far-reaching import."15 7 Justice Marshall, in dis-
sent, called the law paternalistic because it was justified by the state
as an attempt to prevent voters from being confused and from being
influenced by the parties in making their choices. 158
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,159 the Court upheld a
state ban on multi-party, "fusion" candidates from appearing on the
ballot as the candidate of more than one party. The majority upheld
the regulation as supported by the states' "strong interest in the sta-
bility of their political systems."' 60 This stability would be threatened
by "the destabilizing effects of party splintering and excessive faction-
alism." 16 1 As such, this state interest was distinct from a "paternalis-
152. Eu, 489 U.S. at 223.
153. Id. at 224.
154. Id. at 227-28.
155. Id. at 228 (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221
(1986)). The state could, however, justify restrictions on internal party organization
where "necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair." Id. at 233. This would
be a non-paternalist rationale for regulation in that it would not arise from the state's
judgment about what was in the best interests of the regulated party.
156. 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
157. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991).
158. Renne, 501 U.S. at 334, 347 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
160. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 366 (1997).
161. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367.
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tic license for States to protect political parties from the consequences
of their own internal disagreements." 162 Here again, the regulation
was acceptable because the justification advanced had nothing to do
with the speakers' or the listeners' own best interests. The interests
protected - according to the state's proclaimed justification - were
external to the listeners (the overall stability of the political system).
E. SEXUAL SPEECH AND MATERIALS
In cases involving sexual materials, the Court's decisions have
also tracked the antipaternalism principle. In a series of decisions the
Court has struck down regulations aimed at sparing listeners from the
effects, such as being offended, of hearing the speech. This regulation
of the "primary effect" of speech is a species of paternalism because it
seeks to bar citizens access to protected speech for their own good.
The challenge for the state in these cases, as before, is to articulate its
interest as safeguarding something other than the listeners' best
interests.
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,163 for example, the Court
struck down a city ordinance prohibiting drive-in theaters visible to
the street from displaying nudity. The city justified its regulation as a
way to spare viewers from offense. 164 "[T]he Constitution does not
permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected
speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling
listener or viewer."1 6 5 To allow the government to regulate speech on
this basis would be to allow it to regulate based on the primary effect
of the speech on recipients.
In Young v. American Mini Theaters,16 6 however, the Court up-
held an adult-theater zoning ordinance. The city justified the ordi-
nance as a means to avoid the secondary effects of the speech, such as
higher crime in the vicinity of adult theaters. This justification is non-
paternalistic because it is indifferent to the effects of the speech on the
listener.167
162. Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens decried the paternalism of another of the state's
asserted interests: protecting voters from the confusion that might be created by fusion
candidacies. "[Tihe argument that the burden on First Amendment interests is justified
by this concern is meritless and severely underestimates the intelligence of the typical
voter." Id. at 375-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The state could not improve its citizens'
decisionmaking by denying them information. Id.
163. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
164. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975).
165. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 210. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971).
166. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
167. See also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986)
(upholding a zoning ordinance aimed at controlling secondary effects of adult theaters).
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Stanley v. Georgia,168 which struck down a state law criminaliz-
ing the possession of obscene materials in the home, contains some of
the most striking antipaternalist rhetoric in any of the Court's free
speech cases. The Court noted the "right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth;" a right redolent with anti-
paternalism. 16 9 The state had sought "to protect the individual's
mind from the effects of obscenity." 170 The Court's response to this
asserted mind-control interest is powerfully antipaternalist:
We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything
more than the assertion that the State has the right to con-
trol the moral content of a person's thoughts. To some, this
may be a noble purpose, but it is wholly inconsistent with the
philosophy of the First Amendment. 17 1
Although it upheld a law criminalizing the possession of child por-
nography in Osborne v. Ohio,172 the Court was careful to note the
state was not offering a paternalistic justification for the statute. Un-
like in Stanley, the Court declared, "The State here does not rely on a
paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's mind. Rather, [Ohio
seeks] . .. to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to de-
stroy a market for the exploitive use of children." 173 The anti-
paternalist implication of Osborne is clear.17174
Compare Osborne with Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,175 in
which the Court struck down a federal law banning virtual child por-
nography produced, not with real children, but with computers or
other simulators. The government offered several justifications for
the regulation. The government argued the regulation was needed to
make easier prosecutions of actual child pornography, in which real
children are used in production. 176 It also argued the regulation was
needed to eliminate materials that could be used to entice children
into sexual activity.1 77 And it argued banning virtual child pornogra-
phy was necessary to eliminate the market for actual child pornogra-
phy. 1 78 None of these justifications run afoul of the antipaternalism
principle, although the Court found other problems with each of them.
168. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
169. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
170. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
171. Id. at 565-66.
172. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
173. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990).
174. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 991 (2001).
175. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
176. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002).
177. Aschcroft, 535 U.S. at 251.
178. Id. at 254.
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One of the government's justifications for the ban on virtual child
pornography, however, was paternalistic. The state argued virtual
child pornography "whets the appetites of pedophiles," leading them to
illegal conduct.1 79 To the Court, this justification amounted to mind-
control, just as the ban on the possession of obscenity in Stanley did.
In fact, the Court cited both Stanley and Kingsley Pictures as anti-
mind-control precedents.1 8 0
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the gov-
ernment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that
impermissible end. The right to think is the beginning of
freedom, and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought.18 '
As in Stanley, the government in Osborne had sought to justify its
speech regulation on the grounds the speech would poison the mind of
the speech consumer, leading to evil consequences somewhere down
the road. This justification could be cast in non-paternalistic terms,
i.e., as aimed at protecting children from molestation. But there was
no mistaking the initial paternalistic, step: protecting the mind of the
speech consumer from deformity caused by the speech.
F. CHARITABLE SOLICITATION
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind,18 2 the Court struck
down restrictions on fees that professional fundraisers may charge to
raise money for charities, and struck down disclosure requirements.
After dismissing several possible justifications for the restrictions, the
Court dealt with a final one:
The State's remaining justification - the paternalistic pre-
mise that charities' speech must be regulated for their own
benefit - is equally unsound. The First Amendment man-
dates that we presume that speakers, not the government,
know best what they want to say and how to say it .... 'The
very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind
through regulating the press, speech, and religion.' To this
end, the government, even with the purest of motives, may
not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of
speakers and listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive
if directed by the government. 183
179. Id. at 253.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
183. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 790-91 (1988) (quoting Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The Court thus made clear the antipaternalism principle reaches
beyond listener autonomy. It also shields speakers from speech regu-
lations designed to protect speakers in their own best interests.
Justice Scalia, concurring, noted "our traditional understanding,
embodied in the First Amendment, that where the dissemination of
ideas is concerned, it is safer to assume that the people are smart
enough to get the information they need than to assume that the gov-
ernment is wise or impartial enough to make the judgment for
them."1 S4
G. CORPORATE SPEECH
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 8 5 the Court struck
down a state law forbidding certain campaign expenditures by corpo-
rations. The state argued corporate spending on referenda would "ex-
ert an undue influence on the outcome." 18 6 Citing Virginia Pharmacy,
the Court called this a "'highly paternalistic' approach" because it
rested on the idea the government should decide for listeners what
voices should be heard.1 8 7 Voters themselves should be trusted to sift
the information they receive during a campaign.
H. OTHER CASES
In Meese v. Keene, 8 8 the Court upheld registration, reporting,
and disclosure requirements on persons engaged in propaganda on be-
half of foreign powers. The majority and dissent traded charges of pa-
ternalism, with the majority relying on Virginia Pharmacy and
reasoning it would be paternalistic to deny the public the information
required by the disclosure requirements.18 9
II. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF THE ANTIPATERNALISM
PRINCIPLE
A number of important implications of the antipaternalism princi-
ple may be derived from these cases. This Section explores what those
implications are.
184. Riley, 487 U.S. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
186. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978).
187. Belloti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.31 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
188. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
189. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480-85 (1987).
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A. A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFINITION OF PATERNALISM
What does the Court mean by the word paternalism? The Court
has not explicitly defined it, either inside or outside the First Amend-
ment context. It has simply used the word in circumstances that im-
plicitly suggest a definition. I offer the following definition as the best
understanding of what the Court generally means by paternalism in
its free speech cases. I do not suggest the Court has always used the
word in precisely the way I suggest here, but only that this definition
is the best description of what the Court generally means across a
broad range of cases.
In the First Amendment, paternalism means: a restriction on oth-
erwise protected speech justified by the government's belief that speak-
ing or listening to the information in the speech is not in citizens' own
best interests. As we will see, the antipaternalism principle does not
bar all paternalism in speech regulation.19 0
This definition is a specialized one that differs in important ways
from the definition of paternalism commonly offered by economists,
political scientists, or philosophers. Gerald Dworkin's classic defini-
tion of paternalism in moral philosophy, for example, is this: "By pa-
ternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's
liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the wel-
fare, good, happiness, needs, interests, or values of the person being
coerced."19 1
This definition differs in several key respects from the one used by
the Court. First, paternalism in the speech context involves interfer-
ence with speech, not with a person's "liberty of action," understood to
mean non-expressive conduct.
Second, and more importantly for my purposes, the Court's use of
the word is broader than Dworkin's (and most others') in that the re-
striction need not be justified by reference to the interests of "the per-
son being coerced." In Virginia Pharmacy, for example, the state
assembly did not justify its restriction on pharmacists by reference to
the interests of pharmacists.192 Rather, the restriction on pharma-
cists was justified as a way of protecting the public, who were not di-
rectly subject to the advertising restriction, from the consequences of
190. See infra notes 208-30 (noting exceptions for children, government speech,
cases where counter-speech is unavailable or untimely, and false, misleading, or over-
reaching commercial speech).
191. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 107, 108 (R. Wasser-
strom ed., 1971).
192. Though increasing the income of pharmacists may well have been a large part
of the assembly's reason for adopting the restriction. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too




their own choices. For the First Amendment, in other words, a restric-
tion on speaker "may be paternalistic if it is justified by reference to
the best interests of speaker or listener(s)." 193 This use of paternalism
corresponds to the definition offered by Joel Feinberg of "two-party"
paternalism 194 and by Dworkin himself as "impure" paternalism.195
On the other hand, the Court's use of the term is in one sense
consistent with the classic definition in moral philosophy. In cases
like Virginia Pharmacy the Court conceptualizes the person being re-
strained by the law not only as the party prevented from speaking, but
also as the party being prevented from hearing the speech by virtue of
the restraint on the speaker. Coercion is used not only to prevent the
speaker from speaking but the listener from listening. And because
the regulation of the speaker is justified by reference to the listener's
best interests, it is paternalistic as to the potential listener.
There are additional differences between the Court's use of the
word paternalism and others'. In the view of some, paternalism does
not require coercion under threat of criminal penalty at all, but might
also involve giving powerful financial incentives to individuals to con-
form to the state's conception of their best interests. This is some-
times called incentive paternalism. This would not be paternalism for
the Court, or if it is, it would not be impermissible paternalism.
Some would argue that regulation of a person for the benefit of
society as a whole or for the benefit of specific third parties is not pa-
ternalistic. A law against murder is not paternalistic because it is de-
signed to protect someone other than the murderer herself from harm.
This common-sense idea is inapplicable to regulations of speech, how-
ever, where a restriction on A's speech for the supposed good of lis-
193. But see Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom
of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 315, 337 (1997). Sadurski argues that
"[platernalism is typically involved when someone's liberty is restricted on the basis of
an argument about this agent's own good." Sadurski, 15 CARDOZo ARTS. & ENT. L.J. at
337. (emphasis added). On the basis of this definition, which is similar to Dworkin's
classic definition, Sadurski concludes that paternalism is commonly a motive behind
content-based, but not viewpoint-based, discrimination in government speech regula-
tion "because it might be claimed (as a possible argument for a content restriction) that
discussing certain matters is bad for the discussants themselves . . . ." Id. In cases of
viewpoint discrimination, by contrast, the government commonly seeks to restrict the
speaker to prevent some harm (like offense) to the listener. Id. Whatever the merits of
Sadurski's distinction for purposes of content-based and viewpoint-based speech regula-
tion, it takes no account of the Court's own peculiar, and oft-repeated, use of the term
'paternalism" to include regulations undertaken to protect listeners from some message
for their own good. Sadurski's work does not review the Court's use of the term, espe-
cially in the commercial speech cases. The Court's use of the term suggests a broader
understanding of it than the classic definition Sadurski relies upon.
194. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF 172-76 (1986).
195. Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 19, 22 (RolfSartorius ed., 1983).
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tener - may well be paternalistic as to - (that is, if the restriction is
aimed at the communicative aspect of the speech).
One point on which the Court and most commentators seem to
converge about the definition of paternalism relates to consent. Is a
restriction paternalistic if the person agrees to the restriction? In
some cases, the person will agree with the judgment the regulation is
for his own good or for the good of others; in many cases he will not
agree. The pharmacy profession largely (though probably not unani-
mously) concurred with the Virginia Assembly's restriction on phar-
macists' freedom to advertise their prices for prescription drugs. But
the pharmacists (the "speakers") were not free to agree to a speech
restriction that was paternalistic as to consumers (the "listeners").
And it is doubtful they would be permitted to agree to a speech restric-
tion that was paternalistic as to themselves, because First Amend-
ment rights are non-waivable. A regulation is no less paternalistic for
its happy congruence with the preferences of the regulated person,
who may not even be consulted about the regulation. If the person's
preferences change, by hypothesis, the paternalistic regulation may
remain.
B. WHAT THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE FORBIDS
The discussion in Part I has, I hope, demonstrated several fea-
tures of the antipaternalism principle. Here is a summary of what the
principle forbids.
(1) The antipaternalism principle prevents the state from adopt-
ing an information-denying strategy to achieve what it thinks are citi-
zens' best interests.
The antipaternalism principle invalidates speech regulation that
keeps truthful information from citizens - that is, keeps them "in the
dark" - for their own good. This is what I have called an information-
denying strategy. The Court has explicitly rejected information-deny-
ing strategies in most of its cases applying the antipaternalism princi-
ple: Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark Associates, Central Hudson, 44
Liquormart, Lorillard Tobacco, Western States Medical Center, Bates,
Peel, Eu, Stanley, Osborne, Free Speech Coalition, Riley, and Belotti.
The reason for the rejection of information-denying speech regulation
is not hard to fathom. One goal of antipaternalism is informed self-
determination, which depends on allowing citizens to assess for them-
selves the weight to be given the information they receive.
Note an important limitation on this aspect of the antipaternal-
ism principle. A restriction on the noncommunicative aspects of
2004]
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speech (e.g., the size or placement of a billboard 9 6 ) would not be an
impermissible information-denying strategy. The key is identifying
"information" in the speech sought to be regulated in citizens' best in-
terests. If the regulation is not aimed at denying information to citi-
zens, it does not implicate the antipaternalism principle.
(2) The antipaternalism principle restrains the state's role as a
central decision-maker, disabling the state from restricting the flow of
speech as a method of discouraging choices made by individuals in
their own best interests because the state believes those decisions will
harm the collective welfare.
The antipaternalism principle is hostile to attempts by govern-
ment to restrict speech on the grounds that, after receiving speech,
citizens will make decisions based on that speech which in the aggre-
gate harm the collective welfare. Several of the Court's decisions, es-
pecially in the commercial speech cases, highlight this controversial
aspect of the antipaternalism principle. These decisions include: Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, Linmark Associates, Central Hudson, and 44
Liquormart.
If the state's actions in restricting speech in these cases are pater-
nalism, it is of a different kind from that usually associated with the
word. 197 Here, the state constrains individual action to achieve a col-
lective good (e.g., high-quality pharmaceuticals 198 ) or to avoid collec-
tive harm (e.g., panic selling of homes' 99 ). As one commentator put it,
"it consists of a foreclosure of certain individual actions which, if taken
generally, would make everybody or nearly everybody worse off, but
which people have an incentive to take unless assured others will also
abstain."20 0 Such a restriction is paternalistic in the sense that it re-
stricts the choices open to individuals for their own long-term good, as
opposed to their short-term good. It does not operate under the classic
paternalistic assumption that the person constrained cannot appreci-
ate what is good for him, at least in the short-term. 20 1 But it may
reflect a judgment that the citizen cannot appreciate what is in the
best interests of the entire community, and therefore perhaps ulti-
mately his own long-term best interests.
196. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 520 (1981).
197. Sadurski, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. at 368; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Inter-
ference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 1129, 1140-45 (1986).
198. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 766-68 (1976).
199. Linmark Assoc, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977).




(3) The antipaternalism principle forbids information-denying
speech regulation even if the speech restriction will actually accomplish
its aim of manipulating citizens' decision-making in a direction the
state believes is in citizens' best interests.
The antipaternalism principle is non-consequentialist. It recog-
nizes that protecting speech will sometimes entail costs (or at least the
risk of costs) that simply must be borne by society. Free speech is not
free. It usually does not matter to the validity of an otherwise imper-
missible paternalistic justification that the regulation will be success-
ful, as by dampening alcohol consumption. This aspect of the
antipaternalism principle can be see in cases like Virginia Pharmacy,
Linmark Associates, and Western States Medical Center, where the is-
sue was consumption-inducing advertisements. But non-consequen-
tialism is also on display in Eu, where the Court held even if a ban on
endorsements would save a party from self-destruction, it would be
impermissible paternalism. 20 2
However, the Court has been wobbly on this point. In Central
Hudson, the Court implied a restriction on advertising might be ac-
ceptable if the government could show it would actually dampen en-
ergy consumption. 20 3 Similarly, in Edge Broadcasting, the Court
suggested a speech regulation would pass muster if there were an im-
mediate connection shown between advertising and demand.20 4 Even
Rubin and 44 Liquormart, both victories for free speech claimants,
leave open the door to speech restrictions as a means to manipulate
consumers' consumption choices.
(4) The antipaternalism principle invalidates speech regulation
that restricts the flow of information to the receiver of the information,
regardless of whether the regulation directly restrains the speaker or
the recipient.
Most of the impermissible speech regulations invalidated under
the antipaternalism principle have involved restraints on the speaker.
These include, for example, Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark Associates,
Central Hudson, 44 Liquormart, Greater New Orleans Broadcasting,
Lorillard, Western States Medical Center, Bates, Peel, and Edenfield.
Some paternalistic restrictions, however, have also been placed on the
receivers of information. These have included bans on the possession
of certain materials thought to harm the speech consumer in some
manner, as in Stanley and Free Speech Coalition.
202. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 227-28
(1989).
203. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557, 570 (1980).
204. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993).
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There are always alternative, and usually more direct, methods
by which the government can accomplish its aims, even its paternalis-
tic ones. Restricting speech cannot be one of them.
(5) The antipaternalism principle prevents the state from justify-
ing speech regulation based on the primary effect the speech will have
on recipients.20 5
The Court has been careful to distinguish speech regulations
aimed at preventing the secondary effects of speech (e.g., too much
crime in neighborhoods around adult theaters) from those aimed at
the primary effects of speech (e.g., the likelihood the listener will be
influenced by the speech to act in a way the government wants to pre-
vent). The First Amendment permits the former regulation 20 6 but for-
bids the latter.20 7 As Geoffrey Stone, explaining the different
constitutional treatment of content-neutral and content-based restric-
tions, has pointed out:
Unlike content-neutral restrictions, content-based restric-
tions usually are designed to restrict speech because of its
'communicative impact' - that is, because of 'a fear of how
people will react to what the speaker is saying ..
[GIovernmental efforts to restrict speech because of its com-
municative impact usually rest upon constitutionally disfa-
vored justifications. That is, either the government does not
trust its citizens to make wise decisions if they are exposed to
the speech or it fears that the speech will offend others and
perhaps provoke a hostile audience response. Justifications
for the suppression of particular messages that, like these,
are based on paternalism or intolerance, are incompatible
with the basic premises of the first amendment. 20 8
On the other hand, speech regulations aimed at the secondary ef-
fects of speech do not offend the antipaternalism principle because
they are justified by reference to interests unconnected to the informa-
tion in the speech (e.g., home values in neighborhoods where an adult
theater is present), not by reference to the best interests of speakers or
listeners whose interest in the speech the antipaternalism principle
protects. Speech regulations aimed at the primary effect of speech on
listeners - whether they take the form of restriction on the speaker
or the listener - offend the antipaternalism principle because they
reflect a judgment by the state that the listener is incapable of assess-
205. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
206. Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63.
207. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975).
208. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 56-57
(1987). See also Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective in the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 473 (1985).
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ing the value of the speech and whether he can responsibly hear the
speech.
Especially hard questions arise in the context of pornography. If
the state regulates some kinds of pornography on the grounds that
"substantial exposure to sexually violent materials . . . bears a causal
relationship to antisocial acts of sexual violence and, for some sub-
groups, to unlawful acts of sexual violence,"20 9 is it acting paternalis-
tically toward the consumers ("listeners") of pornography? I am
inclined to answer yes, because the regulation would be justified by
the primary effect the pornography has on listeners: they react to
their consumption in socially irresponsible and harmful ways. In fact,
this justification for regulating pornography is strikingly akin to one
justification for regulating virtual child pornography in Free Speech
Coalition: that consuming child pornography will lead consumers to
molest children.
The pro-regulatory response to this conclusion would be that
anti-pornography laws are justified not by a paternalistic desire to
prevent some abstract corruption of the morals of pornography con-
sumers but by the very real and non-paternalistic need to reduce the
social harm of sexual violence to third parties. As such, on this view,
anti-pornography laws are concerned primarily with those harmed by
the availability of pornography (principally women or perhaps chil-
dren, who are disproportionately targeted for sexual violence). Anti-
pornography laws are concerned only incidentally or instrumentally
with the "speakers" (pornography producers) or "listeners" (pornogra-
phy consumers) whom the antipaternalism principle is designed to
protect.
This response has appeal but it is difficult to see how it survives
Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark, Free Speech Coalition and other cases
employing the antipaternalism principle. If the response is right, in
every case the state could seek to justify its speech regulation by refer-
ence to the predicted ultimate harms arising from the listener's inabil-
ity to react appropriately to the regulated speech. Allowing this
justification for speech regulation would swallow the antipaternalism
principle. The question instead must be: do the harmful effects the
state seeks to prevent depend on the effect the speech will have on the
mind of the listener? If so, the regulation is impermissibly paternalis-
tic as to the listener. That seems to be the case with pornography
regulations justified by the need to prevent acts of sexual violence. So,
such speech regulations violate the antipaternalism principle.
209. United States Department of Justice, Final Report: Attorney General's Com-




(6) The antipaternalism principle prevents the state from justify-
ing speech regulation based on the presumed offense the speech will
cause recipients.
The antipaternalism principle not only shuns speech regulations
justified by the state's presumption the listener will not be able prop-
erly to handle or to react to the speech, but also those speech regula-
tions justified by the state's presumption the listener will be offended
by the speech. This much should be clear from Erznoznik, Youngs
Drugs, and the attorney-solicitation cases discussed above.
Under the antipaternalism principle, while it is perfectly accept-
able to shield children from offensive materials, the state may not
treat adults like children. Adults' informational environment may not
be sanitized to a degree suitable for children. Indeed, even in its effort
to protect children from material that may harm them, like sexually
explicit material, the state's regulation must take care not to restrict
the flow of information to adults. 210
C. WHAT THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE DOES NOT FORBID
Despite this substantial list of the ways in which the anti-
paternalism principle limits government's power to regulate speech,
much room for speech regulation remains. The reach of the anti-
paternalism principle, while significant, is not unlimited. Govern-
ment may, consistent with the Court's conception of the
antipaternalism principle, employ a variety of strategies to limit the
flow of speech.
(1) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
adopting an information-providing strategy to achieve what it thinks
are citizens' best interests.
In several of its antipaternalism decisions, the Court has made
clear that government may advance its paternalistic aims in ways
other than restricting speech. It may regulate conduct. It may also
take a more-is-better approach to speech by, in effect, providing the
public its own counter-speech. Decisions affirming the state's power
to adopt such an information-providing strategy include: Linmark As-
sociates, Central Hudson, Bates, Peel, and Meese.2 11
In the context of commercial speech this information-providing
strategy may even take an information-forcing form, permitting the
210. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
211. Posadas is the only case I found in which the Court explicitly rejected an infor-
mation-providing strategy as an adequate substitute for a paternalistic information-de-




state to require that certain additional information relevant to citi-
zens' rational decision-making be included in the speech. 2 12 This in-
formation-forcing strategy may even be pursued where the proposed
speech is not, by itself, false or misleading.
This compulsory strategy is more questionable, on the other hand,
outside the commercial context. 213 Outside the commercial context,
the state's information-providing strategy must ordinarily be accom-
plished through the government's own speech (as in public-service ad-
vertisements) or through incentives given to private speakers to
include the additional information the government wants communi-
cated to citizens.
Note that, in supplying citizens additional information, the state's
underlying paternalistic motivation would remain. It would still be
manipulating the citizens' informational environment in the belief
that their best interests would be served by resisting, say, panic sell-
ing of their homes. A completely non-paternalistic alternative to such
a policy would be to allow citizens to determine the information they
believe relevant to their decisions on whether to sell their homes and
ferret out for themselves any additional information they feel neces-
sary to make good decisions.
(2) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state, in the
limited context of commercial speech, from aiding citizens' informed
self-determination by prohibiting falsity, deception, or overreaching.
In the commercial speech area, the state may restrict the flow of
information that is false, deceptive, or misleading.2 14 It may also pre-
vent overreaching by professionals in a position of special trust.2 15
These exceptions are rooted in the idea that a goal of antipaternalism
is informed self-determination.
Is it impermissibly paternalistic for government to regulate com-
mercial speech in such a way as to encourage rational deliberation by
consumers, e.g., by requiring accurate labeling and advertising of
products? Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued it should make no
difference. 2 16
212. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 109
(1980) (noting that the appropriate means to reduce risk of consumer confusion would
be to require additional disclosures by the attorney).
213. Compare Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988) (striking
down disclosure requirement in charitable solicitation), with Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S.
465, 484-85 (1987) (upholding foreign agent disclosure requirements). In the event the
Court accords full First Amendment protection to commercial speech, as it may yet, an
information-forcing strategy would also be more questionable in advertising.
214. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
215. Id. at 773 n.25.
216. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 592-93.
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On the other hand, if the constitutional problem with paternalism
is that it fails to respect the capacity for rationality in individuals,
then regulating to maximize the exercise of that rational deliberation
may not be problematic. It is true that much advertising, protected by
the commercial speech doctrine, conveys little real information and
seems designed to "create irrational product preferences."2 17 Yet if
advertising is speech, as the Court has held, this by itself is not suffi-
cient to permit free reign to regulate it. The same could be said of
much political speech: it conveys little useful information about the
product (either a candidate or a policy) and seems designed to appeal
to sub-rational or subconscious prejudices. We would think it odd and
even dangerous to permit the regulation of political speech because it
is deemed "misleading" or because it is thought to appeal to emotion
rather than to reason.
The prohibition on false advertising is most easily justifiable on a
theory of informed self-determination. An individual's informed self-
determination does not depend on preserving the right of others to tell
her outright lies. It depends on preserving the right of others to con-
vey information that will aid, not detract from, her decision-making
process.
However, the exception to the commercial speech doctrine al-
lowing the state to ban deceptive or misleading advertising 2 18
presents special challenges to a theory of First Amendment anti-
paternalism. If the exception is anything more than a very narrow
one, it seriously threatens to undermine the information-providing
function of the antipaternalism principle.
The decision about what kind of information may "mislead" or
"deceive" citizens is itself a paternalistic one because it suggests citi-
zens are incapable, at least in some instances, of assessing the quality
of information they receive. It assumes further the state is better
positioned than the citizen herself to determine what information is so
misleading or deceptive she should not even consider it. As noted
above, the First Amendment would not tolerate a restriction on politi-
cal speech on the grounds it is misleading.
The distinction between commercial and political speech here is
based on the plausible supposition that commercial speech is often
provably correct or incorrect, whereas political speech is not. There
are either fifty pieces of candy in a bag, as advertised, or there are not.
217. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.
L. REV. 372, 387-89 (1979) (supporting the application of traditional speech scrutiny to
commercial speech where the justification for the regulation is related to the informa-
tive nature of commercial speech, but supporting lesser scrutiny where the justification
for the regulation is related only to the contractual nature of commercial speech).
218. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
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But who could say with equal certainty whether the expenditure of an
additional $50 million on domestic anti-terrorism efforts will protect
the country from attack or that, even if it would, it is better than an
expenditure of an additional $50 million on education or foreign aid?
For very technical information, such as a listing of ingredients on
a can of food or claims about the curative powers of a drug, the accu-
racy requirement in advertising seems a reasonable and fairly limited
intrusion on the antipaternalism principle. Further, at least where
false or misleading information may endanger citizens' health,
counter-speech may be futile because it comes too late. As noted be-
low, speech regulation does not offend the antipaternalism principle
where counter-speech is unavailable or will be untimely.
The harder cases arise where the allegedly misleading restricted
speech is not technical in nature and presents no immediate hazard.
In such cases, it is hard to square the restriction with the Court's gen-
eral presumption that citizens should make decisions for themselves
based on information they assess for themselves. The further we get
away from technical information, the more likely it is that the deter-
mination about what is "misleading" to the public is itself
paternalistic.
Friedman v. Rogers2 19 seems in some tension with this idea. A
trade name conveys no technical information about optometry ser-
vices, presents no immediate danger to the health of consumers, and
to the extent it is misleading about the quality of services provided it
may be countered by a quick look at the list of optometrists associated
with the practice operating under the trade name. The Court should
reconsider Friedman in light of the antipaternalism principle as it has
developed in the more than two decades that have elapsed since it was
decided.
(3) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
restricting speech in what it thinks are the best interests of citizens
where counter-speech is unavailable or will be futile because it comes
too late.
The antipaternalism principle is not a restatement of the baleful
maxim: "Let justice be done, tho' the heavens may fall."220 In an
emergency, where there will be no time or opportunity for counter-
speech to prevent some evil, the antipaternalism principle will not
stand in the way of government speech restrictions designed to avoid
it. This is an important, but limited, qualification on the antipaternal-
ism principle.
219. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
220. AESCHYLUS, THE ORESTEIA 75 (David Grene et al. eds., 2004).
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Paternalistic restrictions on public access to information are per-
missible only if counter-speech is unavailable to inform citizens' deci-
sion-making. It will rarely be the case that counter-speech is
unavailable. Circumstances will ordinarily permit citizens the time to
seek out, and to consider, alternative views and information. Emer-
gent situations, however, call for more paternalism to prevent harm.
The classic example is the circumstance where a person falsely shouts
"Fire!" in a crowded theater. There is not sufficient time, prior to the
onset of panic, to inform people there is no fire. Counter-speech in
cases like that is unavailing, because it will come too late to prevent
injury. In such cases, paternalistic speech regulation to prevent harm
to listeners is permissible.
Commercial speech is a realm where counter-speech may often be
unavailing. Commercial speech often occurs at the point of sale, so
"consumers may respond to the falsehood before there is time for more
speech and considered reflection to minimize the risks of being
misled."2 2 '
(4) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
providing or withholding information where the state itself is the
speaker, even if the reason for doing so is itself paternalistic.
The state is generally freer to determine the content of speech,
and to justify the inclusion or exclusion of information on any grounds
it deems fit, when the state itself is the speaker. The theory here is
the state in such cases in not acting as speech regulator, but as
speaker. In a public advertising campaign to warn citizens about the
dangers of smoking, for example, the state does not have to include
both pro-tobacco and anti-tobacco viewpoints. Moreover, when the
state is the speaker it can exclude some views solely because it thinks
it is not in the best interests of citizens to hear them.
The result in Rust v. Sullivan,22 2 which upheld a restriction on
what federally funded doctors could tell their patients about abortion,
might be justified under this view. If the doctor is nothing more than
the mouthpiece of the state, the state may command her to say what it
wants her to say, even for paternalistic reasons.
On the other hand, there is a powerful argument, which I am in-
clined to accept, that the doctor-patient relationship entails signifi-
cant interests independent of the state's, even though the state is
funding it. 2 23 If that is true, then the state is not the only relevant
221. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995).
222. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
223. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of
Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1109-37 (1993).
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"speaker" in the exchange between doctor and patient. And if that is
true, the restriction on information about abortion-related services
under the HHS regulations at issue in Rust may be an information-
denying strategy impermissible under the antipaternalism principle.
In that case, the government would have to justify the restriction by
some rationale other than protecting the woman-patient from the in-
formation or from the consequence of making a bad choice upon receiv-
ing it. Rust, on this view, might look very much like Linmark
Associates and the other antipaternalist commercial speech cases in
that it reflects an impermissible judgment by the state that citizens
will behave badly upon receiving some information the government
would rather they not receive.
(5) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
providing or withholding information in what it thinks are the best
interests of children, those confined for mental disability, or others
whom it can be presumed lack the capacity for rational choice.
The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from act-
ing in loco parentis when it comes to those who are presumed to need
extraordinary protection from certain kinds of information by reason
of their presumed inability to handle that information. As the Court
itself demonstrated in Lorillard Tobacco, it is perfectly willing to
countenance paternalistic speech regulation aimed at protecting chil-
dren from the harm of receiving information they are presumed too
immature to weigh. 2 24 John Garvey has ably summed up the Court's
approach to speech regulation restricting what children may see and
read:
Over nearly the whole range of "speech" activities, the courts
have imposed paternalistic restraints on the free speech of
children in order to advance their health, education, and
morals. A minor's freedom to peddle even religious ideas may
be limited in order to avoid "emotional excitement and psy-
chological or physical injury." The child's right of access to
ideas at least those that are vulgar or pornographic, can be
specially limited because a state might rationally conclude
that such matter impairs the child's "ethical and moral devel-
opment." Such cases permit states to "protect" children by
preventing them from doing things adults have a constitu-
tional right to do.2 25
Similarly:
224. Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).




Parallel paternalistic limitations on freedom of expression ex-
ist in the institutional mental health system. Although the
logistics of running a large institution obviously necessitate
some restrictions, in many cases the restraint is justified pri-
marily in terms of the patient's own interests. Statutes fre-
quently permit censorship of incoming mail to promote the
patient's welfare . . . . Similarly paternalistic reasons are
given for permitting qualification of visitation privileges
226
What supports these extraordinary restrictions on free speech is
the fact the citizen at issue lacks the capacity for rational choice. Con-
stitutional freedoms "presuppose that the claimant can make rational
decisions that will not result in significant social or individual
harm."2 2 7 Individual autonomy is respected "only for persons within a
certain range, a range identified by the ability to make rational
choices about how one's self ought to be expressed, realized, and
fulfilled." 228
(6) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
restricting speech in what it believes are the best interests of citizens if
the restriction is unrelated to the information in the speech.
The antipaternalism principle overlaps the content-based/con-
tent-neutral analysis the Court has adopted for reviewing speech re-
strictions generally. A city could ban billboards in a residential
neighborhood because it wants to protect citizens' property values or
because it wants to preserve the general aesthetic environment in the
city.2 2 9 But it could not do so because it wants to protect citizens, in
their own best interests, from the messages those billboards bear. The
first is a regulation on speech justified by the best interests of citizens
(property values, good taste), and thus might be thought in some gen-
eral sense paternalistic. But it does not become the kind of paternal-
ism that concerns the First Amendment until it restricts speech
because the government believes receiving the content is harmful to
citizens' best interests, either because it is harmful per se or because
they will react inappropriately to it.
This much can be seen in the Court's decision in Metromedia,
where the Court upheld the ban on billboards as applied to commer-
cial messages because the regulation aimed at the noncommunicative
aspects of the speech (i.e., the eye-catching nature of commercial
226. Garvey, 94 HARv. L. REV. at 1769.
227. Id. at 1758.
228. Id. at 1759.
229. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-11.
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messages).2 30 It can also be seen in the Court's decision in Friedman,
where the Court upheld a ban on the use of optometrists' trade names
only after concluding such trade names convey no information to
consumers.231
(7) The antipaternalism principle does not prevent the state from
restricting speech in what it believes are the best interests of citizens if
the state has an acceptable non-paternalistic justification for the
regulation.
The antipaternalism principle does not invalidate paternalistic
speech regulations. It discounts paternalistic reasons given for speech
regulations. A regulation may have both paternalistic and non-pater-
nalistic justifications, as may well be the case with the examples cited
in the introduction. 23 2 A given regulation may be justified entirely on
paternalistic grounds, primarily on paternalistic grounds and secon-
darily on non-paternalistic grounds, secondarily on paternalistic
grounds and primarily on non-paternalistic grounds, or entirely on
non-paternalistic grounds. This is as true in the speech context as in
any other. The government often throws up as many justifications for
a speech regulation as it can, hoping that one grabs the Court's fancy.
The antipaternalism principle makes one kind of justification invalid;
it does not require that a law arguably infected with paternalism must
be invalidated if it has another justification that is acceptable.
For example, a law forbidding the possession of obscene materials
may be justified on the grounds that it both protects the mind of the
possessor from moral degradation and that it assists the state's efforts
to suppress the production of obscene pornography.2 33 The first justi-
fication is paternalistic; impermissible under the antipaternalism
principle. The second justification is not paternalistic and so is per-
missible under the antipaternalism principle. If the second justifica-
tion satisfies other First Amendment concerns, the speech regulation
is constitutional - even though the state offered one explanation for
its law that is paternalistic.
230. Id. at 512.
231. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12 (1978). I think the Court was wrong to
conclude that trade names convey no information to the public.
232. For example, the helmet requirement for motorcyclists might be thought to
save society the costs imposed generally by higher injury and death rates for riders who
do not wear helmets. These costs might include the social disruption from serious head
injuries and death, the loss of a provider to surviving family members, the lost produc-
tivity of the injured or killed worker, and the burden placed on the public health care
and/or welfare system by higher injury and death rates. In a socially and economically
interdependent society, collective stakes are plausibly present to some degree in almost
any individual behavior.
233. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-68 (1969).
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Of what use, then, is the antipaternalism principle? If a given
rationale is deemed paternalistic, the state may always offer up a non-
paternalistic one and save the law from invalidation. The value of the
antipaternalism principle is this: when the state seeks to regulate
speech for essentially paternalistic reasons, it will have to find non-
paternalistic rationales for doing so. It will have to cloak its regula-
tion in acceptable garb. But the more the state tries to justify pater-
nalistic speech regulation on grounds other than the true interest it
seeks to serve (the paternalistic one) the more its rationales will seem
attenuated and even pretextual. The non-paternalistic rationale(s)
will often be unconvincing for the very reason that they are makeshift.
Thus, the additional non-paternalistic rationales will be vulnerable to
attack on other grounds, such as the idea that they poorly fit the ac-
tual regulation.
A good example of this phenomenon is the child pornography
cases, where the government may offer both paternalistic and non-
paternalistic justifications for the laws. The antipaternalism principle
forces the government to articulate a non-paternalistic rationale, such
as preventing the enticement of children, that exposes how poorly
drawn the law is to match the claimed interest. If there were no anti-
paternalism principle, the government could always claim the regula-
tion is perfectly tailored to serving its legitimate interest in protecting
the mind of the pornography consumer.
III. THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE AND THEORIES OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
As an approach to freedom of expression, the antipaternalism
principle has both a negative and a positive dimension. This section
explores both dimensions, explaining how the principle fits with prom-
inent theories of the meaning and reach of the First Amendment's free
speech guarantee.
A. THE NEGATIVE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
One conceivable view of the First Amendment is that it is entirely
negative. 2 34 It guarantees nothing affirmative: not deliberative de-
mocracy, 23 5 not individual autonomy,2 36 not a free market of ideas,237
234. Ronald A. Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation
and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1405 (1987) ("Substantive
constraints on federal power were not the product of general beliefs in liberty, but of
more focused fears about its unjustified infringement. This limited, reactive, negative
approach characterized the promulgation of all the substantive limitations on govern-
ment, including freedom of speech."). Cass, 34 UCLA L. REV. at 1405.
235. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 119 (1993).
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not truth.238 Instead, it operates only to restrict what the state can do
in the realm of speech.
This negative view is supported by the famous text and by origi-
nal intent. The text focuses on restricting the power of government:
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."
The phrase "Congress shall make no law" restrains the state; it has no
"values" independent of that, according to this view.2 39 The First
Amendment does not say: "Free speech is guaranteed to enhance de-
mocracy," or "Free speech is guaranteed to preserve individual auton-
omy." The negative view may also be justified as a matter of original
intent because the Framers placed limitations on government power,
including the free-speech limitation, in response "to specific perceived
abuses of government power."2 40
Of course, in restraining the state the First Amendment may well
allow room for individuals to develop their faculties, may well shield a
political environment in which citizens may rationally consider mat-
ters of public importance, may protect a market of ideas the product of
which may be the "good" of truth. But these are by-products, not pur-
poses, of the First Amendment.
One might also say against the negative view that the phrase
"freedom of speech" itself embodies some value, a value perhaps given
content by one or more of the positive theories mentioned. But, the
negative conception responds, if that phrase does have substantive
content it operates only as a way to gauge when government is "mak-
ing a law" the Constitution forbids. This is an important point but it
is important to note what it does not show: it does not demonstrate the
First Amendment guarantees a republic of reasons, or that it man-
dates individual development, or a well-functioning market of ideas.
Under this view, the First Amendment is all shield and no sword.24 1
The antipaternalism principle is in part a negative one, focusing
as it does on the reasons offered by government to justify speech regu-
lation. One type of reason for speech regulation - a paternalistic one
- is inadmissible. The "anti" in antipaternalism emphasizes the neg-
ative dimension. It is, importantly, not the "pro-autonomy principle"
236. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-96
(1982).
237. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
238. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
239. SUNSTEIN, supra note 235, at 1441-42.
240. Id. at 1441.
241. This view is hotly contested. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 255, 274 (1992) (case law "reveal[s] that the First Amendment, even as currently
conceived, is no mere negative right. It has positive dimensions .... It is incorrect to




or the "pro-democracy" principle. Its aims are much less ambitious
than these positive views would be.
The antipaternalism principle is not alone in being a negative ap-
proach to the First Amendment. Frederick Schauer has argued
heightened protection for speech is warranted by "governmental in-
competence," the inability of government "to make the necessary dis-
tinctions, a distrust of governmental determination of truth and
falsity, an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders, and of
somewhat deeper distrust of governmental power in a more general
sense." The history of speech regulation is rife "with what we now see
to be fairly plain errors" such as "the banning of numerous admittedly
great works of art because someone thought them obscene."24 2
The negative antipaternalism principle is a safeguard against
three distinct evils of government speech regulation: incompetence,
entrenchment, and intolerance. The antipaternalism principle guards
against government incompetence. It involves a skepticism of govern-
ment competence, doubting the state's ability to discover and imple-
ment the best informational environment for citizens, its ability to
discover and implement what is true and what is false with respect to
their best interests in the content of information they receive, and cer-
tainly it involves an appreciation of the fallibility of political leaders in
displacing citizens themselves as the best judges of their own
interests.
Besides government incompetence, the antipaternalism principle
guards against government entrenchment. A fear embedded in much
of our free speech jurisprudence is that what will drive government
speech regulation, even where government is competent to discover
some objective best interests of citizens' informational environment, is
a desire of incumbents to entrench themselves and the policies they
favor.2 43 Thus, where the state has adopted an anti-tobacco or anti-
gambling public policy, it will not only seek to advance those policies
by regulating conduct but will seek to do so through preventing con-
trary information from reaching the public. Restrictions on speech
will insulate the substantive conduct regulations from criticism and
democratic debate. Or, speech restrictions will substitute for conduct
regulation, advancing the state's policy through the especially sinister
means of controlling information rather than conduct itself.2 44
242. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982).
243. Free speech keeps clear the "channels of political change." JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-107 (1980).
244. Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOwA L.
REV. 589, 601-602 (1996).
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Finally, the antipaternalism principle guards against government
intolerance. When the government acts paternalistically, it will likely
do so to disfavor unpopular ideas. For example, it would be easy
enough for the state - under the guise of saving voters from confusion
- to regulate political parties in a way that benefits the dominant
ones and disfavors the small, unpopular ones.
All of these problems with speech-regulation paternalism - gov-
ernment incompetence, government entrenchment, and government
intolerance - are addressed by the negative antipaternalism
principle.
B. THE POSITIvE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
Yet the antipaternalism principle has a positive dimension as
well. It conceives of the citizen as the gatekeeper of the information
he receives, of the ideas he considers. It treats the adult citizen as an
adult, presuming his competence rather than his gullibility. It makes
the citizen sovereign over the life of his own mind. In allowing the
citizen to assess the value and soundness of the information he re-
ceives it also exercises his capacity for self-government, that is, the
government of self. This capacity can atrophy when it goes unused or
under-used, as when an external decisionmaker makes the relevant
informational choices.
The relationship of the antipaternalism principle to various posi-
tive conceptions of the First Amendment is complicated. When it
finds the regulation justified by a paternalistic rationale, and no other
acceptable rationale is offered or available, the antipaternalism prin-
ciple invalidates the regulation even if the paternalism is said to serve
some positive purpose like the promotion of deliberative democracy.
I briefly consider below the relationship of the antipaternalism
principle to the three major positive theories of the First Amend-
ment.2 45 These are: the marketplace-of-ideas, individual autonomy,
and democratic self-government.
1. The antipaternalism principle and the marketplace of ideas
In his dissent in Abrams v. United States,24 6 Justice Holmes ar-
ticulated the marketplace-of-ideas rationale for the First Amendment:
245. This is not to suggest that we must choose one value, and one value alone,
protected by the First Amendment. "Instead, we have a web of values, collectively com-
prising our understanding of how people should live." Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1641
(1987).
246. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that
the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market .... 247
Justice Holmes was, of course, only echoing ideas about the role of
free expression already articulated by John Milton 248 and Stuart
Mill.2 49 The relationship between the marketplace rationale for free
speech and the antipaternalism principle is fairly obvious: because it
acts as a brake on attempts by the state to restrict the flow of idea-
product into the marketplace of ideas, the antipaternalism principle
complements this conception of the role of the First Amendment. The
antipaternalism principle has the effect of insuring that more ideas
enter the marketplace than would otherwise be allowed to enter it. In
the absence of the antipaternalism principle, the state could always
justify idea-suppression as a means to protect people from the corro-
sive effects of the ideas. But the antipaternalism principle internal-
izes Holmes' observation that what the state today regards as
corrosive to individuals' minds may be just another "fighting faith"
that time has upset.
There may well be, as some critics of the marketplace conception
have charged, imperfections in the market for speech.2 50 But
whatever imperfections exist in the marketplace of information, the
antipaternalism principle insists they cannot be corrected by speech
regulation justified by the state's distrust of citizens' capacity to as-
sess information. 25 1 The insight of the antipaternalism principle is
247. Abrams, 250 U. S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
248. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing
(1644) (AAnd though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worst, in a
free and open encounter?").
249. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-22 (Currin V. Shields ed., The Bobbs-Mer-
rill Company, Inc. 1956) (1859) ("First, the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by
authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course, deny its
truth: but they are not infallible .... ."). The marketplace rationale has also been criti-
cized, largely by commentators concerned with imperfections in the speech market anal-
ogous to imperfections in the market for goods and services. Stanley Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuxE L.J. 1, 5 (1984) (government
regulation of speech needed Ato correct failures in the economic market caused by real
world conditions"); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,
25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 978 (1978) (arguing that "[t]he marketplace of ideas appears
improperly biased in favor of presently dominant groups. . . ."). See also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 964-65 (1995).
250. Ingber, 1984 DUKE L.J. at 5; Baker, 25 UCLA L. REV. at 978.
251. In the case of political speech, the antipaternalism principle the Court has
adopted protects the citizen's right to receive true as well as false information. In the
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that, in acting to "correct" the marketplace of ideas through speech
regulation, the government is likely to fall prey to the problems of in-
competence, entrenchment, and intolerance identified above. 25 2
2. The antipaternalism principle and autonomy
A second, powerful rationale for protecting the freedom of speech
emphasizes its role in enhancing individual autonomy. 25 3 According
to Martin Redish, an impassioned and consistent defender of this
view, "the constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves
only one true value, which I have labeled 'individual self-realiza-
tion."' 25 4 Individual self-realization includes both "development of the
individual's powers and abilities - an individual 'realizes' his or her
full potential - [and] to the individual's control of his or her own
destiny through making life-affecting decisions - an individual 'real-
izes' the goals in life that he or she has set."2 55
Redish acknowledges the importance of antipaternalism to the
autonomy rationale, casting doubt on the idea that "an arm of the
state should have the authority to decide for the individual that cer-
tain means of mental development are better than others."
25 6
Thomas Scanlon, who also saw an autonomy rationale for speech pro-
tection, saw this antipaternalist impulse in the First Amendment as
well: "The harm of coming to have false beliefs is not one that an au-
case of commercial speech, the information must be true and non-misleading in order to
receive protection. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
252. See supra Section III. A.
253. Individual autonomy is a famously complicated and problematic concept. Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses of Autonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 876 (1994) (criticizing
autonomy-based arguments for First Amendment speech rights because "the value of
autonomy is much more complex than most theorists have imagined"); Christina E.
Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court's
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1997) (re-
jecting the "impoverished notion of autonomy that dominates the debate" over free
speech and suggesting that the Court's use of autonomy is a "far richer and more com-
plex" Kantian idea).
254. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982).
See also MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984) (ad-
vancing the view that self-realization is the ultimate value underlying the First Amend-
ment). Many other commentators have emphasized the autonomy rationale. See
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970) (speech advances
individual self-fulfillment); David A. Strauss, 91 COLuM. L. REV. 334, 353-55 (the "per-
suasion principle" is based on autonomy). But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Autonomy and
Distrust, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1993) (free speech jurisprudence "is much
richer and more complex than the autonomy model would suggest"). Redish eschews
the "autonomy" label as too narrow. Redish, supra, at 620. I will use it here because I
think it is useful and common shorthand that captures much of the idea.
255. Redish, 130 PA. L. REV. at 593.
256. Id. at 627.
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tonomous man could allow the state to protect him against through
restrictions on expression." 2 57
Here, too, the relationship to the antipaternalism principle is
close: because it seeks to prevent an outside force (the state) from
molding the individual through choices it makes for the individual in
what it believes are the best interests of the individual, the anti-
paternalism principle removes the one obstacle from the individual's
ability to develop his own capacities according to what he judges to be
his own best interests.
On the other hand, the antipaternalism principle taken by itself is
much less ambitious than the autonomy rationale for free speech. The
antipaternalism principle disables one kind of justification for speech
regulation. But, taken alone, it would allow other justifications for the
same speech regulation that might well have the effect of intruding on
individual autonomy in the name of some non-paternalistic good the
state sought to achieve. There are important social values beyond in-
dividual autonomy, like public health and equality. A system of free-
dom of expression that exalted autonomy above all else, no matter the
cost, seems extreme. A full explication of an autonomy-based First
Amendment theory needs the antipaternalism principle as one leg, to
be sure, but it cannot stop there. The antipaternalism principle seems
a necessary but not sufficient basis for claiming the First Amendment
protects individual autonomy.
3. The antipaternalism principle and democratic self-government
The antipaternalism principle seems largely at home with the
marketplace rationale and supports, though incompletely, an auton-
omy rationale. But its relationship to a third rationale for protecting
free speech, democratic self-government theory, is more complicated.
Many commentators have emphasized the importance of free
speech to the process of democratic self-government, 258 with some
suggesting the First Amendment protects little more than political
speech. 25 9 A branch of self-government theory has emphasized the
need for the state to regulate speech in the interests of making citi-
zens better democrats. The state would do this by, for example, en-
257. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204
(1972). Scanlon later retreated from his sweeping embrace of autonomy and the ex-
treme antipaternalism it entailed. T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Cate-
gories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 532 (1979).
258. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT 63 (1948); Sunstein, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. at 301; Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100
HARv. L. REV. 781 (1987).
259. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
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couraging greater diversity of opinion and more attention to public
affairs in broadcasting. 2 60 This view emphasizes the need to elevate
public discourse above salacious entertainment, violence, and sex, in
order to enhance the functioning of democracy. The purpose of the
First Amendment, in this view, is to enhance public deliberation and
self-government. According to the democratic self-government ratio-
nale, an informational environment characterized by greater attention
to serious matters will bring the freedom of speech more in line with
the public-purpose role envisioned for it by James Madison and the
other founders.
On the one hand, the antipaternalism principle seems consistent
with democratic rationales for free speech. It enhances the capacity
for self-government by forcing public policy to be more transparent.
Under the antipaternalism principle, the state cannot seek to manipu-
late citizens' decisions indirectly through speech regulation, masking
its purposes and therefore shielding them from democratic accounta-
bility. Instead, it must regulate their lives directly, if at all, under
circumstances where the political process will check the regulation or
at least allow an honest debate about it. That is, government must
regulate citizens' behavior directly, not regulate what information
they hear in order to mold their behavior indirectly.
Additionally, to the extent self-government theorists advocate
more public-affairs programming sponsored or subsidized by the state,
the antipaternalism principle does not stand in the way. As we have
seen, the state is free to adopt an information-providing strategy, even
if the reason it does so is the paternalistic one of thinking it knows
best what information citizens ought to be exposed to. 26 1
On the other hand, to the extent self-government theory calls on
government to restrict the information citizens receive in order to
make them better Madisonian citizens, 26 2 it is at odds with the anti-
paternalism principle, which insists that citizens must make their
own choices about the content of their informational environment in
what they judge to be their best interests. 2 63
260. Sunstein, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. at xix ("[G]overnment controls on the broadcast
media, designed to ensure diversity of view and attention to public affairs, would help
the system of free expression. Such controls could promote both political deliberation
and political equality."); Fiss, 100 HARv. L. REV. at 787-88.
261. See supra Section II. B.
262. Sunstein, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. at 138. Sunstein notes that in European coun-
tries, government regularly intervenes in the speech market to improve the quality of
citizens' informational environment. Id. at 77-88.
263. Others have noticed the tension between the Madisonian/self-government the-
ory of free speech and the antipaternalist premises of the First Amendment. Richard J.
Vangelisti, Cass Sunstein's "New Deal" for Free Speech: Is it an "Un-American" Theory
for Free Speech?, 85 Ky. L.J. 97, 134-36 (1996). General criticism of Madisonian" theo-
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Cass Sunstein rejects the idea paternalism is a convincing criti-
cism of government regulation trying to produce a better informa-
tional environment. This is because, in his view, private preferences
(e.g., a personal preference for watching entertainment instead of pub-
lic-affairs programming on television) themselves reflect current legal
and social practices, rather than a free, informed choice. 2 64
Yet there are serious problems with government's paternalistic
regulation of citizens' informational environment as a method to "im-
prove" the choices they make. These problems combine the dangers of
government incompetence, government entrenchment, and govern-
ment intolerance identified earlier. 26 5 First, paternalistic speech reg-
ulation assumes that government can identify what ought properly be
included in citizens' informational environment. But why should we
trust the decisions of legislators and administrators in this regard?
They operate under their own biases and preferences, after all, which
may only substitute the state's own flawed conception for the citizen's.
Second, paternalistic speech regulation assumes that once the proper
content has been chosen, the government will be able to impose it in a
way that helps, rather than hinders, democratic self-government.
Yet, once again, that imposition will reflect regulators' own flawed
preferences and be hostage to their incompetence. 2 66
It might be possible to accept state intervention to improve the
informational environment on grounds that look less paternalistic.
The argument would go something like this: Degraded media product,
consumed by individual citizens, may impose costs on the collective if
it leads people to be less informed, less likely to vote, and less likely to
be involved generally in politics. The negative externality produced
can be measured in stupid decision-making about important public
policy decisions on welfare, war, the medical care system, taxes, and
other issues.26 7 On this view, by intervening to improve the quality of
public discourse, the state would not be acting paternalistically as to
individual citizens. It would simply be acting to reduce the perceived
social harm of unfettered, poor-quality speech.
The problem with this second justification for state regulation to
improve public debate is that it, to:, is paternalism as the Court has
defined it. Instead of aiming to improve the quality of the speech envi-
ries of free speech have also been offered. Ronald W. Adelman, The First Amendment
and the Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 1125, 1131-33 (1996).
264. Sunstein, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. at 74.
265. See supra Section III. A.
266. See infra Section IV.
267. C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What it Wants, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 311, 352




ronment for the individual citizen, here the state would do so in the
best interests of the citizens as a whole in order to check the harmful
consequences of their cumulative individual choices. But, as the
Court suggested in cases like Linmark Associates, this is just speech-
regulation paternalism applied to the collective. 268 The dangers
presented by collective paternalism are similar to the dangers
presented by the more frankly paternalistic rationales mentioned
above: incompetence, ejatrenchment, and intolerance.
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE
I want to anticipate and to respond to several possible criticisms
of the antipaternalism principle. The first possible criticism is that, in
fact, there is no antipaternalism principle animating the Court's free-
speech cases. The second criticism is the antipaternalism principle is
simply a restatement of other, familiar free-speech doctrines. It adds
nothing new to our understanding of what the Court has been doing in
the area of free speech. The third criticism is that recognizing an anti-
paternalism principle in free speech jurisprudence creates an asym-
metry with other important parts of the Constitution, where no such
principle is recognized. The final criticism I consider is the most fun-
damental one, and I devote the most attention to it. It argues pater-
nalism is justifiable, even in speech regulation.
A. FREE SPEECH DOES NOT REALLY EMBRACE ANTIPATERNALISM
One commentator, Daniel Lowenstein, has canvassed the Court's
commercial speech cases and concluded they establish no general bar
to paternalistic speech regulation, the Court's frequent protestations
notwithstanding. 269 Lowenstein's argument is based on a definition
of paternalism that excludes speech regulation enacted for the benefit
of the collective, as opposed to the individual. According to Lowen-
stein, paternalism means "speech restrictions intended to protect the
consumer against his or her own imprudent action." 2 70 He claims to
derive this definition from the Court's commercial speech cases. Thus,
on this view, the regulation in Virginia Pharmacy was not paternalis-
tic because it was enacted to protect consumers as a whole, not to pro-
tect the individual consumer.
Lowenstein misapprehends the Court's use of the concept of pa-
ternalism. Even in the limited realm of the commercial speech cases,
it seems clear the Court means something more than regulations de-
268. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977).
269. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff": Persuasion, Paternalism, and Com-
mercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1237-47 (1988).
270. Lowenstein, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1238.
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signed to protect the individual consumer against his own foolishness.
It also means regulations designed to protect citizens collectively from
their foolishness. These cases include: Virginia Pharmacy, Linmark
Associates, Central Hudson, and 44 Liquormart.27 1 Outside the com-
mercial speech context, which Lowenstein did not examine, this
broader meaning is even more plain.2
72
The Court's use of the word "paternalism" is so common in its free
speech cases, as opposed to its constitutional decisions not involving
free speech, that it would be odd to think the Court meant nothing
important by it. We can, of course, debate precisely what the Court
means, or how far it is willing to extend the principle, but something
significant is animating the Court's frequent invocation of the concept
in this area of constitutional law.
B. THE ANTIPATERNALISM PRINCIPLE IS JUST A RESTATEMENT OF
FAMILIAR FREE SPEECH DOCTRINES
The second criticism of the antipaternalism principle - that it is
just a restatement of familiar free-speech doctrines - contradicts the
first, because it suggests antipaternalism is so well-established that
articulating it is redundant. Indeed, an appealing feature of the anti-
paternalism principle is that it is consistent with so many existing
doctrines in free speech jurisprudence. The Court's distrust of con-
tent-based speech restrictions reflects a suspicion of government's
ability to choose the content of speech citizens ought to hear for their
own good. The autonomy rationale for the First Amendment - which
seeks room for individual self-determination and actualization - em-
phasizes the need to protect citizens from do-gooder intervention by
legislators who assert they know better than individuals themselves
what is required for healthy development. The prohibition on regulat-
ing speech because of its primary effects - that is, the impact it has
directly on listeners - reveals the Court's hostility to the state's esti-
mation of what citizens can bear to hear before it harms them.
More than a few commentators have referred to the First Amend-
ment's antipaternalism in passing, without further argument or ex-
planation, as if the point were so obvious it needed little or no
argument. 2 73 The question, then, is whether the antipaternalism
271. See supra Section II.
272. See supra Section I.
273. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate,
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 127, 145 n.39 ("paternalistic justifications for the suppression of
information in public debate are incompatible with the basic premises of First Amend-
ment theory, and are thus constitutionally disfavored"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free
Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 950 (1995) ("redistribution and pa-
ternalism are theoretically forbidden grounds for the regulation of speech"). But see
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principle as such adds anything useful to our understanding of the
First Amendment.
I think it does. To the extent it provides support for several estab-
lished doctrines (like the familiar primary-secondary effects distinc-
tion or the hostility to content-based speech regulation), it helps to
explain and rationalize them. It shows why they are justified or im-
portant as ways to circumscribe the state's power to regulate speech.
It also shows how they might be connected to one another, rather than
having them pop up as isolated points in the cases.
But it also adds to some of these existing themes. Take the anti-
paternalism principle's closest cousin, listener autonomy, which in-
sists that listeners must be given information so they can exercise
their autonomy and develop their individual capacities as they direct
that development. Though there is considerable overlap, the listener
autonomy value is both broader and narrower than the antipaternal-
ism principle. Although antipaternalism is often justified on listener
autonomy grounds, its focus is not on the value of speech to listeners
but on limiting the range of justifications available to the state. Anti-
paternalism is state-focused, not listener-focused, and thus has an ar-
guably stronger basis in the negative wording of the text of the First
Amendment, which focuses on what government may not do rather
than what individuals may do.
The antipaternalism principle in First Amendment cases is some-
times present where listener autonomy is, at most, a secondary con-
cern, or may not be served at all by striking down the regulation. On
the other hand, a regulation intruding on listener autonomy may be
justified if the state has a non-paternalistic justification for its action.
The fact a speech regulation invades listener autonomy is often, but
not invariably, fatal under the First Amendment; the fact that it is
"paternalistic" (at least as to competent adults) is always fatal.
Another closely related free-speech idea is what David Strauss
calls the "persuasion principle." 27 4 As Strauss articulates it, under
the persuasion principle, "the government may not suppress speech on
the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do some-
thing the government considers harmful."2 75 I agree the persuasion
principle "is a version of the First Amendment's 'widely shared hostil-
Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV.
761, 788 (1986) ("Perhaps it is time to face up to the paternalism of the first amend-
ment, and maybe much of the rest of the constitution as well.").
274. David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991).
275. Strauss, 91 COLUM. L. REV. at 334.
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ity to paternalism .... ,,2 76 However, although perhaps "a version" of
the antipaternalism principle, the persuasion principle - like listener
autonomy - is not the same thing. The antipaternalism principle is
indifferent to whether the government believes listeners will be per-
suaded by speech. Its concern is somewhat broader: it disfavors gov-
ernment justifications for regulation of speech the government
believes is not in the citizen's best interests to receive, regardless of
whether the government believes the citizen will actually be per-
suaded by it. The government concern invalidated by the anti-
paternalism principle is in the citizen's very exposure to the idea or
information, not the citizen's acceptance of it.
C. THE ASYMMETRY PROBLEM
Paternalism as a justification for regulation of conduct is gener-
ally constitutionally acceptable. 27 7 One possible, though hardly cer-
tain, exception to this general rule is the Court's treatment of privacy
under its substantive due process jurisprudence. The Court's protec-
tion of aspects of personal privacy, such as the right of married, or
unmarried people to use contraceptives, or the right of a woman to
have an abortion, might be thought to embody an antipaternalist prin-
ciple barring government regulation for the good of the people being
regulated.278 The Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas,2 7 9 striking
down a Texas sodomy law, has reinvigorated the idea that individual
"liberty" interests invalidate government paternalism in the regula-
tion of sexual conduct. So it may now be the case that antipaternalism
has seeped into the Court's substantive due process doctrine. If that is
the case, the Court has not yet been specific about that seepage. It
has used "autonomy" to describe the individual interest at stake in the
privacy cases. 28 0 It has not yet explicitly announced that "paternal-
ism" is an invalid state interest in the area of sexual conduct
regulation.
Even if the regulation of sexual conduct is an area where the
Court has implicitly adopted an antipaternalism principle, the general
rule is that conduct may be regulated for paternalistic reasons. How-
ever, paternalism as a justification for regulation of speech may not be
276. Martin H. Redish and Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Mo-
tors: Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 235,
267 (1998).
277. See supra Introduction.
278. Non-paternalistic interests, such as the state's interest in protecting unborn
human life, are also present in these cases.
279. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
280. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558-59 (2003).
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regulated for paternalistic reasons. Why does this asymmetry exist in
the constitutional treatment of paternalism?
After all, it does not have to be this way. Three other configura-
tions for the regulation of speech and conduct are possible. One possi-
bility is the Court could reverse the asymmetry it has adopted by
allowing paternalistic justifications for regulation in the speech con-
text but disallowing it in the conduct context. Alternatively, the Court
could adopt one of two symmetrical approaches. It could accept pater-
nalism as a justification for regulation in both the speech and conduct
contexts. Or it could reject paternalism as a justification for regula-
tion in both contexts.
Is the Court's asymmetrical approach - disallowing paternalistic
justifications for speech regulation but not for conduct regulation -
justifiable? There is both a textual and theoretical-structural justifi-
cation for the Court's asymmetrical approach to the regulation of
speech and conduct.
Consider first the textual basis for the Court's asymmetrical ap-
proach. The First Amendment is a rare constitutional provision. It is
directed at reining in the state; indeed, its command is aimed entirely
at the state ("Congress shall make no law. . . ."). For that reason, the
text suggests it is the rationale offered by the state that must be ex-
amined before the regulation can be allowed. No burden is placed on
the individual to show the value of his speech. There is no parallel
textual restriction on conduct. There is no provision that says, "Con-
gress shall make no law abridging the freedom of conduct," or "Con-
gress shall make no law abridging liberty."
The text of the First Amendment is also unusual in that its reach
is unlimited. There is, of course, a constitutional mandate that gov-
ernment may not deny a person "liberty . . . without due process of
law."2 8 l On its face, the mandate seems procedural. Liberty may not
be denied unless "due process" is accorded the person. If "due process"
is accorded, "liberty" may be denied. There is no parallel qualification
on the First Amendment's command. It does not say, "Congress shall
not deny the freedom of speech without due process of law." The tex-
tual burden on the state's justification is both heavier and qualita-
tively different in the free speech context. Once we have determined
the "freedom of speech" is at issue, the text commands that the gov-
ernment shall "make no law" abridging it. 2 8 2 The Court's asymmetri-
281. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V, XIV § 1.
282. Redish, 130 U. PA. L. REV. at 601 n.56 ("By its terms, the First Amendment
right of free expression is unlimited in its reach, while the Fifth Amendment protects
other forms of liberty from deprivation only 'without due process of law.'").
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cal approach in embracing the antipaternalism principle thus reflects
the constitutional text's own partiality toward the freedom of speech.
There is also a theoretical-structural justification for the Court's
asymmetrical treatment of speech: it serves the interests of effective
democratic decision-making. Indeed, freedom of expression ought
properly to be seen as a precondition for the effective functioning of a
democracy, the one freedom that allows for self-correction in a demo-
cratic polity.
Assume there is error in some government policy regulating mar-
kets. If special judicial protection is given to speech, it is left open to
citizens to criticize the error in regulation. Citizens are free publicly
to describe the effect of the law, its practical consequences, and to ar-
gue it should be eliminated. Their fellow citizens are free to receive
that message, offer rebuttals, and suggest refinements. The error can
then be corrected through democratic deliberation and normal demo-
cratic processes.
By contrast, assume there is the same error in market regulation
but no special judicial protection is given to speech. The usual method
for calling attention to the error, public debate, is unavailable. Thus,
the error may remain largely unnoticed and unchallenged. Even if the
error is noticed, proposals for eliminating it could be shut off. The
normal channel for change simply cannot function as it should.
The same justification for heightened judicial scrutiny of speech
regulation in general applies to the asymmetrical application of the
antipaternalism principle in particular. If the government adopts a
paternalistic conduct regulation - like closing down gambling casinos
- citizens are free to criticize the policy and argue for change in the
usual democratic manner. By contrast, if the government is free to
adopt a paternalistic speech regulation shutting off the supply of in-
formation about gambling casinos, criticizing the government's policy
in an informed way becomes far more difficult and perhaps impossi-
ble. Paternalistic speech regulation may insulate government policy
from criticism and democratic change in a way that paternalistic con-
duct regulation will not.
D. PATERNALISM IS JUSTIFIABLE, EVEN IN SPEECH REGULATION
The most fundamental challenge to the antipaternalism principle
is that paternalism is sometimes justified, indeed essential, as a foun-
dation for sound public policy. This point is widely conceded in non-
speech regulation. Much paternalistic policy - like the establishment
of forced individual retirement investments through the Social Secur-
ity system - goes almost unchallenged. When pro-paternalism argu-
ments are applied to speech, however, they are harder to justify.
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1. The debate over paternalism generally
There is a lively debate over whether paternalism can be justified,
and if so, under what conditions and on what grounds it might be jus-
tified. It is not my purpose to enter this larger debate, but to offer an
overview. Some scholars, especially those identified with the law-and-
economics movement, attack paternalism as inefficient and counter-
productive. 28 3 A response within the same movement holds the oppo-
site view, that under some circumstances paternalism can be efficient,
especially where people's preferences are irrational. 28 4 Still others,
pointing to the limits of individual human reason and the frequency of
market failure, see broad areas where it is legitimate.28 5
It is at least conceivable that antipaternalism might be justified
on principled grounds that have nothing necessarily to do with the
economic analysis of law. It might be thought that "treating people
paternalistically deprives them of the opportunity to learn from their
own mistakes" and thus retards their development as fully mature,
autonomous people. 28 6 Too, the government may abuse its power to
regulate paternalistically and regulate in ways that really do not ben-
efit the people subject to regulation, but benefit those in power (gov-
ernment entrenchment) or a select group sympathetic to those in
power (government entrenchment and intolerance). In this jumble of
perspectives, there is a consensus only that legal paternalism toward
children and mental incompetents is justifiable.
2. The objective-goods theory and preferences
Paternalistic speech regulation, like paternalistic regulation gen-
erally, often rests on a conception that there is an objective good, dis-
coverable by the state, that a person ought to be made to pursue, or to
acquiesce to, even when that conception opposes the person's own con-
ception of what is good. This view holds that because individual pref-
erences are a product of fallible human reason, and are often shaped
by circumstances beyond the person's control, they should not be
taken as a brute fact immune from beneficial refinement and evolu-
tion. Under this objective-goods theory, a person's overall happiness
283. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
284. Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 249-54 (1988);
Paul Burrows, Patronizing Paternalism, 45 OxFoRD EcON. PAPERS 542 (1993); David L.
Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 526 (1988).
285. George A. Akerlof, Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. (Papers
and Proc.) 1 (1991); George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Conse-
quences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1982); Robert C. Ellickson,
Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law
and Economics, 65 CHi-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Thomas S. Men, Cognitive Imperfec-
tions and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385 (1989).
286. Zamir, 84 VA. L. REV. at 276.
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might therefore be maximized by enforcing the state-recognized con-
ception of the good on her, despite the frustration she feels in not be-
ing permitted to pursue her own conception of what is good for her.28 7
The objective-good justification for paternalistic intervention is
questionable on several grounds. It asserts, first, that some objective
good for an individual exists independent of the person's own assess-
ment of that good. Take state-mandated retirement savings as an ex-
ample. The government, through the Social Security system,
mandates that individuals put aside money earned now, that is, it
mandates they make themselves poorer today, for future income se-
curity. Some individuals subject to such a system may prefer to live
well while young and take the consequence of possible penury when
aged. It is possible they will underestimate the level of unhappiness
they will feel later in life or that they will underestimate the
probability of such poverty.28 8 On the other hand, at least a few indi-
viduals will correctly assess the risks and rewards of deferred enjoy-
ment of their present income, and yet still prefer not to save for
retirement. The state may conclude that, for a variety of reasons,
many more people will misjudge these future consequences than will
correctly judge them. For this majority, paternalism may be appropri-
ate because it only arrives at the very conclusion they themselves would
reach given their own preferences if they could properly assess the rela-
tive benefits and risks. Paternalism, for these people, actually serves
their end-preferences (ideal preferences) by suppressing their irra-
tional or ill-informed existing preferences (actual preferences).
On the other hand, at least a few people, shown the light by the
state, would still prefer to live it up now. How could it be said that, for
these people, paternalism maximizes even their ideal preferences and
thus is "good" for them? In that case, the state is left to argue the gain
in overall social happiness from a system of forced savings for retire-
ment will offset the combined loss in happiness caused by frustrating
the actual preferences of the majority and the ideal preferences of the
dissenting minority. It must also argue there is no practical or cost-
effective way of allowing the true dissenters, with their minority ideal
preferences, to opt-out of the system.
287. Id. at 237.
288. There is ample empirical evidence for errors of this kind. ROBIN M. HOGARTH,
JUDGMENT AND CHOICE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DECISION (2d ed. 1987). Among the com-
mon types of cognitive error to which decisionmaking is prone are: over-optimism re-
garding low-probability events, succumbing to social pressure, wishful thinking,
illusions of control, inability to make complex computations carefully and accurately,
influence by the manner of data presentation, and an excessive discount rate of future
costs and benefits. Zamir, 84 VA. L. REV. at 268-71.
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Paternalism may even be justified as a method of satisfying indi-
viduals' actual preferences. Actual preferences may be divided into
first- and second-order preferences. In a given individual these may
sometimes directly conflict.28 9 I crave buttermilk pie (my first-order
preference) but I want to lose weight (my second-order preference). I
prefer sex without a condom (my first-order preference) but I want to
avoid sexually-transmitted infection by a potentially fatal virus (my
second-order preference). State paternalism may be justified, argues
Cass Sunstein, as a method of satisfying second-order preferences. 2 90
A famous example of this division between first- and second-order
preferences is the story of Ulysses and the Sirens.29 1 Ulysses' first-
order preference, upon hearing the Sirens' alluring song, would be to
go to the Sirens, causing his demise. His second-order preference is to
survive his encounter with the Sirens. To satisfy his second-order
preference, Ulysses has himself tied to the mast of the ship so he can-
not escape when the ship sails by the Sirens' sound. Here his second-
order preference has clearly frustrated his first-order preference. But
it would be odd to say a sailor on the ship who tied Ulysses to the
mast, and then refused to untie him despite Ulysses' desperate pleas,
had acted for the good of Ulysses against his actual preferences. He
has only enabled Ulysses to satisfy his second-order actual preference
over his first-order actual preference. If the sailor's action is "pater-
nalism" at all, it is surely the least objectionable form.
One problem with this justification for paternalism is this exam-
ple starts to look like something other than paternalism: it is really
just a pre-commitment strategy concocted by the restrained individual
himself.2 92 In the Ulysses story, Ulysses himself has identified and
asked for assistance in the enforcement of his second-order preference.
The sailor has not done this for him. When the state, on the other
hand, regulates on the basis it is maximizing second-order preferences
over first-order preferences it must implicitly claim it can identify and
enforce for a very large number of people their second-order prefer-
ences independently of the judgment of the individuals being
regulated.
Next, the objective-good justification for paternalism assumes the
state is a reliable discoverer of the objective good. Whether the demo-
cratic state, with all the imperfections of the legislative process and
the biases to which regulators may themselves be prone, is systemati-
cally a better judge of what's good for individuals than are the individ-
289. Zamir, 84 VA. L. REv. at 242.
290. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1129, 1140-41 (1986).
291. DWORKIN, supra note 191, at 29.
292. Zamir, 84 VA. L. REV. at 243-44.
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uals themselves is a contestable and controversial proposition. The
probability of error by the state in assessing what's best for individu-
als may be so high that we should presume against paternalism.
Finally, the objective-good theory holds the state is an effective
enforcer of the objective good. But this is surely questionable. First,
the state will often take blunt instruments to precise problems, sweep-
ing in behavior its paternalistic justifications do not cover. Second,
not all people have the same ideal preferences or second-order prefer-
ences, although there will often be a strong consensus about certain
ideal preferences and second-order preferences. In that case, the state
is left to make a consequentialist argument that the overall social
good will be served by paternalistically enforcing others' second-order
or ideal preferences on dissenters. 293
Whatever persuasive force the objective-good justification for pa-
ternalism may have in other areas of life, it seems foreign to the free-
dom of speech protected by the First Amendment. This conclusion
holds both for autonomy-based and democracy-based accounts of the
value of free speech. People generally place more importance on mak-
ing their own decisions about what to say and what to read than they
do on many other aspects of their lives, such as whether to wear a
seatbelt or to save for retirement. Thus, more is lost, the cost is
higher, when speech is regulated paternalistically than when most
other aspects of life are regulated paternalistically. Even if some indi-
viduals do not place greater importance on producing their own speech
or on consuming others' speech than on other matters, the need for
democratic accountability necessitates that society do so.
One response to the concern that paternalistic regulation will
frustrate individual preferences might be that legal norms themselves
influence people's preferences. 2 94 For example, a person who initially
resists wearing a car seatbelt in compliance with a paternalistic
seatbelt law may, over time, grow to prefer wearing a seatbelt while
driving and would do so even if the law requiring it were repealed. 2 95
This is an adaptive preference shaped by the law itself.
This preference-shaping effect of law may extend to speech regu-
lation. Legal rules governing broadcast media that allow heavy doses
of violence or sex or celebrity gossip to dominate the airwaves may
themselves shape preferences to include a strong taste for such mate-
rial over more educational or civic-minded programming. On this ac-
293. Id. at 243.
294. Id. at 244.
295. I own up to my own changed preference about car seatbelts. When seatbelt
laws were first adopted, I found wearing a seatbelt confining and uncomfortable. Now,




count, paternalistic intervention to encourage or even to mandate
more public-affairs programming may only "correct" the preference-
shaping effects of earlier regulation.
This argument rests on the plausible idea that we are "regulat-
ing" speech even when we do so through the rules of property, tort,
and contract than through direct speech regulation. 29 6 So it is wrong
to say speech regulation is entering some pre-political, unregulated
realm. Speech regulation may serve the noble goal of enriching and
improving public debate.
The problem with this justification for interventionist speech reg-
ulation is that, for purposes of the First Amendment, not all "regula-
tion" is created equal. The First Amendment distrusts some types of
regulation more than others. Speech regulation that takes a content-
neutral form (like a restriction on the time, place or manner of speech)
is less troubling than content-based regulation because the former is
less likely to be suffused with ideological bias, favoritism, and govern-
ment entrenchment. "Regulation" by the law of property, contract,
and tort is more like content-neutral regulation than like content-
based regulation. A direct speech regulation requiring, say, that pub-
lic news outlets devote a portion of their coverage to what the state
deems "public affairs" programming is a form of content-based regula-
tion. Someone will have to decide what constitutes public affairs pro-
gramming, whether the news outlet has satisfied the requirements,
what must be done to meet the requirements, what punishment must
be meted out to violators of the speech regulation, and so forth. That
"someone" will be a functionary of the state, perhaps an administra-
tive agency which, through institutional bias or through a desire to
entrench incumbents or through ideological partisanship will be prone
to exercising its power in ways inconsistent with the fundamental pre-
mise of the First Amendment that the state must not mandate "what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of
opinion .... ",297 The attempt to improve the quality of the informa-
tional environment through paternalistic speech regulation will be
prone to the usual problems of government incompetence, government
entrenchment, and government intolerance that lead us to give speech
special protection to begin with.
The problem, then, with the republican vision of speech is not that
its description of the regulatory effect of background law is wrong, or
that its vision of more informed public debate is repugnant. The prob-
lem is that it seeks its end by means deeply at odds with the skepti-
296. CASs R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993).
297. W. Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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cism of state power embodied in the antipaternalism principle at the
core of the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have noted the anomaly that is free speech anti-
paternalism. Paternalism is widely derided in theory but embraced in
fact. No responsible adult likes to believe he stands in relation to the
state as a child to an adult. Every person likes to believe he knows
what is best for himself and that it is not the state's business to over-
rule his choice of ends or means for his own good. Yet, paternalism
pervades the law; it is evident in everything from anti-gambling laws
to contract law. The Constitution is not understood to bar the pater-
nalism in such laws.
However, in this Article I have argued the First Amendment is
hostile to paternalistic justifications for speech regulation. This hos-
tility can be seen across the Court's free-speech jurisprudence, espe-
cially its commercial-speech doctrine. It is also evident in free speech
cases involving lawyer solicitation and advertising, political parties,
sexual speech and related zoning laws, charitable fundraising, cam-
paign finance, and corporate speech.
Based on my review of the Court's antipaternalist decisions, I
have offered a working definition of paternalism: a restriction on oth-
erwise protected speech justified by the government's belief that speak-
ing or receiving the information in the speech is not in citizens' own
best interests. When government offers a paternalistic justification for
speech regulation, the antipaternalism principle strongly disfavors
that justification. To sustain its speech regulation, the government
must then come up with some non-paternalist rationale.
I have outlined six commitments of the antipaternalism principle.
These are: it prevents the state from adopting an information-denying
strategy to achieve what it thinks are citizens' best interests; it re-
strains the state's role as a central decisionmaker; it is non-conse-
quentialist; it invalidates speech regulation no matter whether the
regulation takes the form of a restraint on the speaker or the recipi-
ent; it disallows speech regulation based on the primary effect the
speech will have on recipients; and it prevents the state from justify-
ing speech regulation based on the presumed offense the speech will
cause recipients. At the same time, I have noted limitations on the
antipaternalism principle.
Further, in this Article I have examined the relationship of the
antipaternalism principle to prominent negative and positive theories
of the First Amendment, including the self-government, autonomy,
and marketplace rationales for the protection of free speech. Finally, I
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have anticipated, and attempted to rebut, criticisms of the anti-
paternalism principle.
Although the antipaternalism principle is not an all-encompass-
ing principle of free speech law, it does reflect a powerful intuition
about the First Amendment. Though it may generally tell us what to
do for our own good, government's power ebbs when it tells us what to
say or hear for own good. The risk is too great that error in paternalis-
tic speech regulation will arise from government incompetence, gov-
ernment entrenchment, and government intolerance. Paternalistic
error in speech regulation risks deforming the entire democratic pro-
cess. Determining our own informational environment based on our
own judgment of what is best is the basis for good government over
the rest of our lives.
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